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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 3.6 4.0 1.6 2.9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.4 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.5 
Investment 50.8 51.7 -31.0 -6.3 9.8 
Exports 39.3 4.4 7.8 7.5 5.2 
Imports 33.2 18.5 -9.4 -0.7 6.0 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 25.1 5.0 7.2 8.9 4.5 
Gross National Product (GNP) 13.8 11.5 4.4 8.9 4.7 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.1 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.8 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.9 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,057 2,132 2,194 2,257 2,313 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 226 195 158 136 123 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 10.0 8.4 6.7 5.7 5.1 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -4.9 -1.4 -1.0 -0.7 0.3 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -1.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 76.8 73.5 68.4 64.2 60.7 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 11.6 -11.4 24.9 40.6 45.6 
Current Account (% of GNP) 5.8 -5.1 10.7 16.0 16.6 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 99.9 3.1 1.3 1.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.8 29.6 6.5 2.5 3.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 97.6 69.0 -29.3 2.4 -31.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 352.6 7.4 -0.3 7.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 6.4 3.5 
   
Final Demand 557.0 554.6 -0.4 0.5 -0.9 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  271.1 263.3 -7.9  1.6 -9.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.1 2.8 
   
GDP at Market Prices 273.2 294.1 7.6 0.4 7.2 
Net Factor Payments  -51.1 -61.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 222.2 233.1 4.9 0.5 4.4 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 4.2 0.9 27.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 81.8 85.7 3.9 4.7 
Other 102.2 113.3 11.1 10.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.1 0.0 
  
Statistical Discrepancy 0.5 -2.8 
  
Net Domestic Product 236.7 250.6 13.9 5.9 
Net Factor Payments -51.1 -61.0 -9.9 19.3 
National Income 185.6 189.6 4.0 2.2 
Depreciation 63.9 72.0 8.1 12.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 249.5 261.6 12.1 4.8 
Taxes less Subsidies -27.4 -28.4 -1.1 3.9 
GNP at Market Prices 222.2 233.1 11.0 4.9 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 42.4 89.3 46.9 
F -49.9 -59.8 -9.9 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.6 -0.8   
Balance on Current Account -11.4 24.9 36.3 
as % of GNP -5.1 10.7 15.6 
i v  |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nom ic  C omme nt ary  –  A ut um n  20 1 8  
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.9 103.1 3.9 1.0 2.9 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 31.2 5.4 1.3 4.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.0 67.0 -3.0 3.6 -6.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 382.5 8.5 0.9 7.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.5 3.0 
   
Final Demand 554.6 587.4 5.9 1.3 4.6 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  263.3 265.8 1.0 1.7 -0.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.8 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 294.1 321.6 9.3 0.4 8.9 
Net Factor Payments  -61.0 -67.2    
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 254.4 9.1 0.2 8.9 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 4.2 4.3 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 85.7 90.7 5.0 5.8 
Other 113.3 117.0 3.7 3.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.0 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy -2.8 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 250.6 275.0 24.4 9.7 
Net Factor Payments -61.0 -67.2 -6.2 10.2 
National Income 189.6 207.8 18.2 9.6 
Depreciation 72.0 74.8 2.8 3.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 261.6 282.6 21.0 8.0 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.4 -28.2 0.2 -0.9 
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 254.4 21.3 9.1 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 89.3 116.7 27.4 
F -59.8 -70.9 -11.1 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 24.9 40.6 15.7 
as % of GNP 10.7 16.0 6.2 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 103.8 107.5 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 31.2 33.1 6.1 1.5 4.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 67.0 75.6 12.9 2.8 9.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 382.5 409.4 7.0 1.8 5.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 587.4 628.6 7.0 1.7 5.2 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services  265.8 283.3 6.6 0.5 6.0 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 321.6 345.2 7.3 2.7 4.5 
Net Factor Payments  -67.2 -70.8    
GNP at Market Prices 254.4 274.4 7.9 3.0 4.7 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 4.3 4.3 0.1 1.4 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 90.7 95.8 5.2 5.7 
Other 117.0 120.3 3.3 2.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.0   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1   
Net Domestic Product 275.0 296.7 21.7 7.9 
Net Factor Payments -67.2 -70.8 -3.6 5.4 
National Income 207.8 225.9 18.0 8.7 
Depreciation 74.8 77.5 2.7 3.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 282.6 303.3 20.7 7.3 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.2 -28.9 -0.7 2.6 
GNP at Market Prices 254.4 274.4 20.0 7.9 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 116.7 126.1 9.4 
F -70.9 -74.8 -3.0 
Net Transfers -5.1 -5.7 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 40.6 45.6 5.0 
as % of GNP 16.0 16.6 1.8 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
The Irish economy continues to perform significantly better than most OECD 
economies and is once again likely to register the fastest growth rate in the Euro 
Area in 2018. Indeed in the present Commentary we have revised up our forecast 
for GDP from 4.7 per cent to 8.9 per cent in 2018. Our forecast for 2019 has also 
been revised upwards to 4.5 per cent. In preparing forecasts for 2019, we assume 
that a European Economic Agreement (EEA) will exist between the UK and the EU 
after March 2019. 
 
There are two reasons for the revision; firstly domestic consumption and 
modified investment have grown at a faster pace through the first half of 2018 
than was previously expected. Secondly, considerable volatility in the trade 
balance, with imports registering negative growth over the same period has also 
led us to revise our forecasts. This change is mainly due to a sizeable reduction in 
imports of research and technology related services amongst certain 
multinational firms.  
 
The most substantial risk facing the economy is the outcome of the Brexit 
negotiations. The summit of European Union leaders in October may provide 
some clarity concerning the nature of the UK withdrawal, however at this stage it 
is prudent to assume that a no-deal outcome is a real possibility. 
 
This has significant implications for the forthcoming budgetary process. In a small 
open economy such as Ireland, at this point in the cycle, the most prudent policy 
would be to run budgetary surpluses and reduce the level of indebtedness. This 
would provide buffers to withstand future economic shocks. However, with the 
infrastructural deficits in areas such as housing, and the potential adverse 
implications of Brexit, there is a case that Budget 2019 should be a ‘holding 
budget’ and should, therefore, look to neither inflate nor delate the economy. If a 
no-deal Brexit were to materialise in March 2019 the economy could be 
confronted by a highly adverse economic shock. Either way, given the strong pace 
of current economic activity and the possibility of a highly adverse shock, a 
neutral budget is the optimal policy choice at this point. Increased international 
trading tensions could also have negative implications for domestic growth in 
2019.  
 
In focussing on the investment activity of domestic enterprises, the paper with 
the Commentary is of particular interest; Gargan et al. (2018), using new unique 
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survey data, profile the types of assets Irish SMEs are investing in and the barriers 
firms face to investment. Amongst the policy issues to arise from the analysis is 
the finding that most Irish SMEs fund a high share of investment using internal 
funds and that Irish firms tend to prioritise investment in fixed rather than 
intangible assets. Any perceived shortage of investment amongst SMEs would 
appear to be due to high levels of risk aversion and/or a reluctance to use 
external finance amongst firms rather than credit access difficulties. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, this would suggest that domestic SMEs would 
appear to be able to increase investment without hitting constraints in the near 
term.  
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The International Economy 
 
Although the global economy continues to demonstrate strong positive growth 
for 2018, a number of worrying trends have emerged. Aggressive protectionist 
policy measures and increasingly difficult conditions among emerging markets 
threaten the global outlook. Furthermore, increased US interest rates have led to 
an exodus of capital from emerging markets. While growth in the US economy 
remains quite strong, Europe looks set to experience more moderate growth 
particularly as the ECB unwinds its accommodative monetary policy. While the 
IMF still expects global GDP to grow by 3.9 per cent in 2018 and 2019, their most 
recent report highlights the accumulation of downside risks.1 
 
During Q2 2018, while the broader international outlook remained buoyant, 
economic activity in the European Union slowed marginally. When accounting for 
seasonal adjustments, annual real GDP growth fell from 2.3 per cent in the 
previous quarter to 2.1 per cent. The pace of private consumption growth has 
fallen leaving the EU reliant on trade to maintain the current growth outlook. 
Given the accumulation of global risk factors and exports growth declining 
sharply from 6 per cent growth in the second half of 2017 to 2.8 per cent in Q2 
2018, it appears unlikely that the contribution from trade will be able to 
compensate in this manner. Annual real GDP growth rates in Q2 2018 for 
Germany, France, Spain and Italy fell to 1.9, 1.7, 2.7 and 1.2 per cent respectively. 
 
As of July 2018, unemployment has fallen to 8.2 per cent for the Euro Area with 
rates ranging from a low of 2.3 per cent in the Czech Republic to a high of 19.5 
per cent in Greece. The ECB appears set to taper the net asset purchases 
programme to €15 billion per month between October and December, effectively 
halving the monetary stimulus to the Euro Area and laying the groundwork to 
fully unwind the extraordinary monetary stimulus in 2019. Inflation in the Euro 
Area rose to 1.7 per cent in Q2 2018, while inflation in July reached 2.1 per cent. 
If the rate of inflation remains at or below 2 per cent over the coming months, 
this will enhance the likelihood of an increase in the policy rate in 2019 given the 
ECB’s price stability target.  
 
The UK economy experienced marginal growth for Q2 2018, yielding a 1.3 per 
cent annual increase in real GDP. However, a relatively lacklustre domestic 
performance, the approaching Brexit deadline, and mounting trade tensions have 
 
                                                          
 
1  International Monetary Fund, 2018. ‘World economic outlook: a survey by the staff of the International Monetary 
Fund’, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, July 2018. 
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led to downward revisions in UK growth forecasts across leading economic 
institutions. As of July 2018, HM Treasury’s consensus forecast produced medians 
of 1.3 per cent growth in 2018 followed by 1.5 per cent growth in 2019.  
 
Since June 2016, the Pound Sterling (GBP) has lost roughly 10 per cent of its value 
relative to the Euro. This has increased the cost of imports and introduced 
significant inflationary pressure (2.5 per cent inflation in July 2018). The Bank of 
England introduced a further interest rate increase of 25 basis points in August 
2018, given that inflation has been above target for the past six quarters. 
Although unemployment has fallen to 4 per cent in Q2 2018, persistently 
elevated rates of inflation and low productivity per worker has slowed the 
increase in real wages. As displayed in Figure 1, average real wages rose on an 
annual basis by 0.4 per cent in June 2018. Increased financial pressure in 2017 
has caused UK households to overspend relative to their income for the first time 
since 1988, averaging £900 in excess of disposable income across the country.2 
On a national basis, this implied £25 billion worth of overspending.  
 
FIGURE 1 GBP DEPRECIATION AND REAL WAGE GROWTH, THREE-MONTH AVERAGE (%) 
 
Source:  ONS database, UK labour market: August 2018. 
Note:  Total pay includes bonuses while regular pay excludes bonus payments. Average exchange rate of 0.8 between 2005 and 2018. 
 
The recently published White Paper by the UK government, outlining its 
preferences regarding a relationship with the EU, has been met with a mixed 
reception both in the UK and Europe. Generally, the proposal seeks to secure UK 
borders with respect to inward migration while placing a stronger focus on 
securing the free trade of goods relative to services. The National Institute of 
 
                                                          
 
2  ONS, 2018. ‘Making ends meet: are households living beyond their means?’, UK Sector Accounts Article. 
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Economic and Social Research (NIESR) highlighted the similarities of the desired 
trade agreement with terms established between the EU and Switzerland, 
suggesting the UK government may need to make concessions in terms of labour 
mobility to get such a proposal accepted by the European Parliament. In the most 
recent edition of National Institute Economic Review, Kara et al., in their paper 
‘Prospects for the UK economy’ include the simulated effects of a soft Brexit in 
contrast to the White Paper proposals and a no-deal scenario.3 The White Paper 
scenario results in lower output growth stemming from an immediate reduction 
in services exports to the EU. Compared to a hard Brexit, the implications of the 
White Paper proposals for GDP and inflation are less negative.  
 
Real GDP in Japan grew by 1 per cent for Q2 2018, fuelled by improvements in 
domestic consumption and exports. As of June 2018, annualised inflation stood at 
0.2 per cent when excluding volatile food and energy prices. Japan’s trade 
outlook remains promising as the ‘Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (CPTPP)4 has secured half of its required six 
ratifications. However, potential US auto tariffs of between 20 and 25 per cent, if 
enacted, could place a significant burden on this positive trade outlook.  
 
US economic growth yielded an annualised real GDP growth rate of 4.2 per cent 
in Q2 2018. Personal consumption of goods and net exports recovered 
significantly (+3.8 combined percentage point contribution), following an 
underwhelming performance in Q1 2018. As of July 2018, the US unemployment 
rate declined to 3.9 per cent. The outlook for inflation is quite steady with the 
Federal Reserve raising the official interest rate to 2 per cent in June 2018. While 
US exports increased by 9.3 per cent on an annual basis for the second quarter, 
slow investment growth (-0.5 per cent) and previously weak export growth (+1.7 
per cent averaged over the past four quarters) suggests the increase in exports 
may be partially due to firms attempting to sell inventories. The Chinese economy 
experienced annual growth of 6.7 per cent in Q2 2018. Annual Chinese inflation 
increased to 2.1 per cent in July, following an inflation rate of 1.9 per cent in June. 
Chinese exports grew in July by 12.2 per cent while imports rose by 27.3 per cent.  
 
The following section examines the recent increase in tensions in global trading 
relationships.  
 
 
                                                          
 
3  Kara, A., A., Hantzsche, J., Lennard, L., Cyrille, M., Lopresto, R., Piggott, and G., Young (2018). ‘Prospects for the UK 
Economy’, National Institute Economic Review, No. 245, F10-40.  
4  The CPTPP was originally known as TPP, as Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement that had been signed in 2016 but never 
entered into force as a result of the US withdrawing. The remaining 11 nations held a formal signing ceremony for 
CPTPP, which no longer requires the participation of the US. To come into effect, the agreement requires ratifications 
from six nations, of which three have ratified the agreement thus far.   
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US trade tariffs 
The US has imposed a number of tariffs, with the administration arguing that this 
will repair the nation’s trade balance and lessen national security risk exposures. 
Having initially introduced a set of indirect tariffs in early 2018 against the rest of 
the world, the US administration quickly provided exemptions for 34 countries. 
This cohort represented the source of 55 per cent of aluminium imports into the 
US in 2017. For US steel imports, the exempted group represented 68 per cent of 
total steel imports in 2017. While Western economies to date have seen little 
impact as a result of these exemptions, even strong US allies including Israel have 
been the subject of significant tariffs. From a global perspective, the greatest 
implications of tariff increases centred on intensifying friction between the US 
and China. US imports of Chinese goods and services were worth over $500 
billion in 2017, roughly one-fifth of total US imports. In the same year, the US 
exported $120 billion in trade to China, 8 per cent of total US exports. 
 
Table 1 lists an abridged chronology of the deteriorating trade relationship 
between China and the United States thus far. Currently, this increased use of 
tariffs between both countries shows no sign of abating with the possibility of 
tariffs being applied to greater shares of the $500 billion of US imports and $120 
billion of Chinese imports. 
 
TABLE 1 THE CHINA-US TRADE WAR (2018) 
Effective 
Date From To Goods $bn (2017) Tariff Rate 
Indirect Tariffs 
Jan 23 US RoW Solar Panels 8 30% 
Jan 23 US RoW Washing Machines 2 20-50% 
Mar 23 US RoW Steel 9 25% 
Mar 23 US RoW Aluminium 10 10% 
Direct Tariffs 
Jul 6 US China 818 Products 34 25% 
Jul 6 China US 659 Products 34 25% 
Aug 23 US China 279 Products 16 25% 
Aug 23 China US 333 Products 16 25% 
Potential Tariffs 
Sept 23 US China 6,000 Products 200 10-25% 
Sept 23 China US 5,207 Products 60 5-10% 
 
Source:  United States International Trade Commission Dataweb (Solar Panels, Washing Machines, Aluminium); Commerce 
Department’s Import Monitor (Steel Mill Products). 
Note:  US imports of solar panels includes light-emitting diodes due to data being limited to 6-digit code (HS: 854140). US imports 
of washing machines includes interchangeable parts, maintained at 4-digit HS code (HS: 8450). 
 
From an Irish economic perspective in 2017, US imports of aluminium and steel 
from Ireland were worth $7.4 million and $5.9 million respectively. While Ireland, 
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to date, has benefited from tariff exemptions on these two items, the current 
trade war and any further escalations will adversely impact potential Irish growth 
in the short to medium term. Ireland’s status as a small open economy means any 
deterioration in global trade will directly impact the Irish economy. According to 
previous ESRI estimates, if world GDP were to fall by 1 per cent, Ireland would 
likely experience a similar decline. The IMF has recently estimated that in a worst-
case scenario, the current trade war could lower global GDP by 0.4 per cent in 
2018 and 0.5 per cent in 2019.5  
 
Emerging market turmoil: Turkey 
As of August 2018, the US doubled steel and aluminium tariffs on Turkey, which 
exacerbated trading conditions for the already struggling Turkish economy. The 
combination of prolonged economic turmoil and recently increased US tariffs 
resulted in the Turkish Lira depreciating against the Euro by an average of 21 per 
cent between July and August, as seen in Figure 2A.  
  
The underlying problem with the Turkish economy is the sizeable increase in both 
household and corporate debt over a sustained period of time. For example, 
banking sector loans increased 32.6 per cent year-on-year in August 2018. In 
2017, external debt represents 53.2 per cent of GDP, with much of the debt 
denominated in Dollars. The nation is also experiencing high, accelerating 
inflation with the Consumer Price Index measuring a 15.9 per cent year-on-year 
increase as of July 2018. Another unsustainable element of the Turkish economy 
is its sizeable current account deficit, which grew by 55 per cent, year-on-year, in 
June. As a result of a high current account deficit and extreme weakness in the 
Turkish Lira, foreign currency reserves have been dwindling over the past 18 
months. As of June 2018, reserves have fallen year-on-year by 16.5 per cent. 
Should these reserves reach critically low levels, this could ignite a further flight 
of capital.6 
 
Given Turkey’s particularly high reliance on external debt, any threat to the 
performance of the domestic economy could posit a large default risk to exposed 
lenders also. As seen in Figure 2B, roughly 70 per cent of Turkish debt is 
concentrated among five European nations, with Greece having reduced its share 
considerably since Q2 2015. Spain and Italy maintain significant shares of external 
 
                                                          
 
5  International Monetary Fund, 2018. ‘G20 Surveillance Note: G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ 
Meetings July 21-22, 2018, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
6  It should be noted that Turkey has been purchasing vast amounts of gold over the last year, likely anticipating the 
consequences of continued erosion of relations with Western Allies and the precarious nature of the domestic 
economy. This process expanded gold purchases from September 2017 onward, with annual growth rates in the 
stock of gold peaking at 67.5 per cent in December 2017.  
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Turkish debt, with claims representing 2.5 and 0.6 per cent of total assets 
belonging to each nation’s top five banks, respectively.7  
 
FIGURE 2 TURKISH CURRENCY CRISIS 2018 
   A. EUR-TKY Exchange Rate        B. Exposure (% of Total Foreign Claims) 
  
 
Sources:  Eurostats (left) and Bank for International Settlements (right). 
Note:  Measured from Consolidated banking statistics (CBS_PUB) using total claims on an immediate counterparty basis. 
 
Figure 2 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies.  
 
FIGURE 2 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
         Euro Area               United States    United Kingdom 
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
                                                          
 
7  Statista, Banks and Financial Services, total assets of leading banks.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
Goods 
The net export of Irish goods contributed €7.4 billion to the trade surplus for Q2 
2018. In Figure 3, goods trade in Q2 2018 saw Irish exports grow at an annual rate 
of 17.8 per cent while imports increased by 3.9 per cent. Over the past four 
quarters, for every €1 worth of goods Ireland imported, the economy exported 
€2.48 worth of goods.  
 
FIGURE 3 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
While goods are owned by Irish resident firms, some goods may never physically 
cross the Irish border as a form of trade. When examining Irish goods, foreign-
owned Irish resident firm activities such as processing and merchanting must be 
taken into account.8 For example, cross-border trade values effectively exclude 
the trade of ownership goods (e.g. contract manufacturing, merchanting). 
However, such cross-border trade values arguably provide a better understanding 
of domestic exporter activity.9 
 
                                                          
 
8  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘Contract Manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies 
residing in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish 
economy, due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export.  
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
9  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO’s ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
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The recent growth of cross-border imports has exceeded that of exports, 
resulting in a persistently decreasing trade balance on a cross-border basis. 
However, in Q2 2018 a combined annual increase of 14 per cent in exports and a 
2 per cent decrease of imports led to an unprecedented €4.8 billion contribution 
to the trade balance for goods. This marks the largest contribution since 2009. 
Figure 4 highlights how persistently higher growth rates in goods imports caused 
a consistent year-on-year decline in the trade surplus since Q2 2017. However, 
for the most recent quarter (Q2 2018), a significant surplus was experienced.  
 
FIGURE 4 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In the most recent publication of the Balance of International Payments, the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO) released quarterly measurements of goods for 
processing and merchanting in Ireland between 2016 and early 2018. Prior to this 
release, the QEC normally estimated the sum of goods for processing and 
merchanting which we refer to as ownership trade. These new values reveal 
goods for processing (often referred to as ‘contract manufacturing’) have 
dominated goods exports since 2016, accounting for 90 per cent of total 
ownership exports and a third of total goods exports.  
 
Merging estimates between 2012 and 2015 with CSO values for 2016 onwards 
allows value of ownership trade to be identified. Figure 5 highlights how a sudden 
growth of this ownership trade inflated total goods exports. This increase led to 
total exports being 58 per cent greater than cross-border exports between 2015 
and early 2018. Prior to 2015, total exports were, on average, only 14 per cent 
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greater than cross-border exports. Goods for processing (mostly contract 
manufacturing) are one of the main reasons for the increase in export values in 
recent years. As a result, the goods balance of trade effectively doubles when 
ownership trade is taken into account.  
 
FIGURE 5 CROSS-BORDER AND OWNERSHIP TRADE OF GOODS (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
Note: Ownership trade includes, but is not limited to, forms of goods for processing such as contract manufacturing, and 
merchanting, the purchase and resale of goods which do not enter the merchant’s economy.  
 
 
The 14 per cent annual increase in cross-border exports stems largely from 
‘Chemicals and related products’, which grew by 22 per cent between the second 
quarters of 2017 and 2018. Within this category, medicinal and pharmaceutical 
exports appear to be the main determinant of growth, having grown by 50 per 
cent between Q4 2017 and Q2 2018. Chemical products, including medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products, now represent 62 per cent of total cross-border 
exports. Cross-border imports declined by 2 per cent in Q2 2018 relative to the 
same period last year. ‘Machinery and transport equipment’ and ‘Chemicals and 
related products’ represented 39 and 25 per cent of total imports, respectively. 
Machinery imports fell by 6.6 per cent and Chemicals by 0.3 per cent for the same 
period. 
 
Table 2 compares exports and imports between regions for the first half of the 
year. The overall trade balance with the UK fell (-€0.7 billion) as exports of 
Chemicals and related products saw a 20 per cent fall compared to the same 
period last year. Excluding the UK, the EU trade surplus increased by 10 per cent 
(+€1.0 billion), due to a significant increase in chemical exports. Overall trade 
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with the US saw the greatest improvement compared to the first half of 2017, 
with the trade surplus between Ireland and the US increasing by 42.8 per cent 
(+3.8 billion). This was largely due to a 25 per cent reduction in US goods imports.  
 
TABLE 2 JANUARY-JUNE ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS  
 Exports Imports 
Total – UK -7 3 
 Food and live animals 4 6 
 Chemicals and related products -20 -20 
 Machinery and transport equipment -12 8 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2 2 
   
Total – Rest of EU 13 14 
 Food and live animals 5 5 
 Chemicals and related products 23 84 
 Machinery and transport equipment -14 -11 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 3 -1 
   
Total – US 9 -25 
 Food and live animals -48 18 
 Chemicals and related products 29 -45 
 Machinery and transport equipment -47 -16 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0 -1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Services 
Given that two-thirds of total Irish imports are based on the purchase of foreign 
services, even marginal declines in service growth can have a significantly positive 
effect on the trade surplus, as reflected in the trade balance for 2017. Following 
contractions in R&D-related activities throughout 2017, in Q1 2018 services 
appear to be returning to normal levels. Exports grew by 1.1 per cent while 
imports declined by 5.4 per cent, relative to the same period last year.  
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FIGURE 6 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN IRISH SERVICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Exports of computer services maintain impressive growth in Q1 2018, rising by 
16.6 per cent relative to the same period last year. Significant and consecutive 
declines in business services since Q2 2017 have moderated overall growth rates 
in service exports. Royalties & licenses and business services formed 75 per cent 
of services imports in Q1 2018. Successive year-on-year reductions in both items 
have contributed to five consecutive quarters of import declines, as reflected in 
Figure 6. Imports of research and development services experienced the largest 
annual decrease, falling by 42 per cent in Q1 2018.  
  
FIGURE 7 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Trade Balance 
For Q2 2018, total exports increased at an annual rate of 9.7 per cent to 
€95 billion while imports fell by 5.7 per cent to €66 billion. This resulted in a 
significant contribution to the Irish trade surplus. As previously noted, adjusting 
for the inclusion of ownership trade produces noteworthy differences in the 
overall trade balance. Figure 8 highlights these differences, facilitating the 
assessment of domestic trade activity and Ireland’s international competitiveness 
over the past ten years. Most notably, due to the inclusion of ownership trade, a 
domestic trade deficit in 2016 (-6.4 per cent of GDP) was transformed into a 
major trade surplus (15.9 per cent of GDP).  
 
FIGURE 8 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
Note: Adjustment to net trade accounts for ownership trade of goods. This includes, but is not limited to, forms of goods for 
processing such as contract manufacturing, and merchanting, i.e. purchase and resale of goods which do not enter the 
merchant’s economy.  
 
Another reason for the volatility evident in the domestic trade balance is due to 
changing trading patterns amongst service providers located in the Irish 
economy. In recent years, Ireland has been a net importer of computer and 
license services. This involved sales activities occurring domestically using 
intellectual properties from abroad. However, now that much of this activity has 
been relocated to the Irish economy, Ireland now acts as a net exporter with 
respect to computer service/license payments. The changing trends may be 
observed in Figure 9. 
 
Due to the volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as services, 
forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based on trends in trade patterns 
linked to underlying Irish economic activity. QEC forecasts of exports have been 
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adjusted to 7.5 per cent and 5.2 growth in 2018 and 2019, respectively. For these 
same years, imports are expected to fall marginally by 0.7 per cent in 2018, 
increasing by 6.0 per cent in the following year.  
 
FIGURE 9 NET COMPUTER AND ROYALTY/LICENSE SERVICES AND INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT 
(€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Current Account 
The current account balance combines trade balances with international net 
income flows. In Ireland’s case, outflows of income generally moderate the major 
trade surpluses arising from positive net exports. Figure 10 decomposes the 
current account into goods, services, primary and secondary income. Changes 
relative to the previous quarter offset the increase in the net trade surplus of 
goods, leading to a relatively stable current account balance in Q2 2018.  
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FIGURE 10 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, QUARTERLY (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
From an annual perspective, the current account has been rather volatile in 
recent years. Significant increases in R&D related activities contributed towards 
this volatility, motivating the calculation of a modified current account (CA*). In 
Figure 11, the various excluded components are identified, allowing for the 
calculation of the CA*. Vast amounts of IP depreciation and R&D activity explain 
the majority of the divergence between these two measures of the current 
account. As a percentage of modified gross national income (GNI*), the CA* fell 
from 2.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent between 2016 and 2017. 
 
FIGURE 11 MODIFIED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, ANNUAL (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
The headline rate of output growth in the domestic economy has been revised 
upwards in the present Commentary due to two factors. First, domestic economic 
factors have strengthened through the first half of 2018 with both consumption 
and modified investment increasing at a faster rate than previously expected.  
 
More importantly, the second reason for the higher forecast is the revision of our 
forecast for imports in 2018. As noted in the International Section, the most 
recent data indicate a reduction in imports of research and technology related 
services from the MNE sector. This has led to substantial declines in the overall 
level of imports and a sizeable improvement in the trade balance. Consequently, 
our forecast for GDP has increased significantly.  
 
Recent data breaking down the gross value added (GVA) for ‘Foreign-owned 
Multinational Enterprises’ and ‘Other Sectors’10 provide more insight into the 
underlying rate of domestic activity outside of the multinational sector. Figure 12 
plots the year-on-year growth in GVA for the Other Sectors category over the 
period 1996 to 2017. The recovery in this sector appears to have peaked in 2015 
at over 8 per cent, with growth rates of 5.4 and 4.3 per cent in 2016 and 2017 
respectively. 
 
                                                          
 
10  The ‘Other Sectors’ category are those sectors of the Irish economy which are not dominated by multinational 
enterprises. 
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FIGURE 12 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATES (%) IN GVA FOR ‘OTHER SECTORS’ 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
International monetary environment  
Despite considerable tensions around international trade arrangements and the 
ongoing Brexit negotiations, international financial markets have experienced a 
relative calm through the second and third quarters of 2018. This relative 
tranquillity follows a period of heightened volatility towards the beginning of 
2018. Figure 13 outlines the CBOE VIX index,11 the market standard measure of 
volatility. For Q2 2018 and into Q3, the index has declined pointing towards a 
more stable financial market environment. The continued accommodative 
monetary policy stance in Europe and Japan as well as the well telegraphed 
nature of US policy rate increases are potentially contributing factors to this 
decline. 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  The VIX Index is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-day expected volatility of the US stock 
market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500® Index (SPXSM) call and put options. On a global basis, 
it is one of the most recognised measures of volatility, widely reported by financial media and closely followed by a 
variety of market participants as a daily market indicator. 
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FIGURE 13 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database, from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
From a European perspective, the ongoing ECB negative policy rate position is 
one of the main catalysts for ensuring financial and money market stability in the 
face of an increasingly uncertain global economic environment. The Eonia rate 
(Figure 14) remains anchored at -0.4 per cent in line with the stated ECB policy of 
maintaining a negative overnight rate. 
 
FIGURE 14 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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This accommodative monetary policy stance, coupled with the implementation of 
the public sector asset purchase programme from the ECB, has led to a 
stabilisation and fall in the cost of financing for Eurozone governments. Figure 15 
presents the ten-year government bond yields for a selected group of economies. 
As of June 2018, Irish ten-year bond yields stood at 0.8 per cent below the 
Eurozone average. Importantly, despite a peak in the first months of this year, the 
cost of borrowing has begun to trend downwards in Quarter 2. This is in contrast 
to financing costs for other economies such as Italy where political tensions have 
led to uncertainty around debt sustainability. The decoupling of Ireland from 
other peripheral economies is a particular success and points towards increasing 
market confidence in Ireland’s economic and financial prospects.  
 
However, Ireland remains highly indebted both from a public and a private sector 
perspective. As noted in the previous Commentary, the expected unwinding of 
the ECB’s extraordinary measures as well as the gradual normalisation of the 
policy rate pose considerable risks to such a leveraged economy. Locking in long-
term government funding at current low rates would be advisable and prudent as 
well as continued efforts to reduce the debt burden.  
 
FIGURE 15 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (%) 
 
Source:   St. Louis Fed. database. 
 
Household credit and mortgage market 
For the Irish mortgage market, Q1 2018 represents an important turning point in 
a return to normalisation of lending practices. For the first time since 2009, the 
stock of outstanding mortgage lending has grown as new lending outstrips 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
01
-2
00
5
07
-2
00
5
01
-2
00
6
07
-2
00
6
01
-2
00
7
07
-2
00
7
01
-2
00
8
07
-2
00
8
01
-2
00
9
07
-2
00
9
01
-2
01
0
07
-2
01
0
01
-2
01
1
07
-2
01
1
01
-2
01
2
07
-2
01
2
01
-2
01
3
07
-2
01
3
01
-2
01
4
07
-2
01
4
01
-2
01
5
07
-2
01
5
01
-2
01
6
07
-2
01
6
01
-2
01
7
07
-2
01
7
01
-2
01
8
US Germany Eurozone UK Ireland Italy
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 8  |  2 1  
repayments. Figure 16 presents the growth rates of credit to households from 
Irish resident credit institutions. The data are split by loans for house purchase 
and other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). On an 
annualised basis, outstanding mortgage lending grew by 0.2 per cent to Q1 2018. 
Non-mortgage credit also continued to expand in Q1 2018 at an annualised rate 
of 2.1 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 16 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics.  
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
As the decline in the level of credit to households appears to have bottomed out, 
the share of mortgages in arrears also continues to fall. The improvement in the 
labour market as well as increasing house prices are both factors in determining a 
lower arrears rate. Policy actions in the banking sector in terms of achieving 
sustainable arrangements for borrowers are also contributing to the decline. As 
of Q1 2018, the share of loans in arrears stood at 6.7 per cent, down marginally 
on the previous quarter and down from 7.3 per cent year-on-year. This 
constitutes a total of 10.2 per cent of the balance of outstanding PDH mortgages. 
The default rate on buy-to-let (BTL) loans has also reduced but remains at 15.2 
per cent of accounts.  
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FIGURE 17 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to principal dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater than 
90 days past due on their payments.  
 
In terms of new mortgage lending, in Q2 2018 the volume of new mortgage 
drawdowns increased by 16.5 per cent year-on-year, and the value of mortgages 
increased by 22.2 per cent year-on-year. This represents an acceleration in the 
rate of growth of the volume of loans. Over the past 12 months, the relatively 
higher growth rate in the value relative to the volume of loans reflects the fact 
that borrowers are drawing down larger and larger loans in an increased house 
price environment (albeit the most recent data indicated a marginally lower 
mortgage size in Q2 2018 than Q1 2018).  
 
FIGURE 18 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF NEW MORTGAGE DRAWDOWNS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
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Trends in SME and corporate credit market 
Turning to the provision of credit to Non-Financial Corporations, in Q1 2018 the 
overall stock of credit continues to decline, down by 5.7 per cent year-on-year. 
However, much of the decline is concentrated in the financial intermediation and 
property sectors which continue to have a debt overhang from the crisis period. 
Credit to enterprises not in property or financial services grew in Q1 2018 by 0.3 
per cent year-on-year. The growth for these sectors, coupled with the growth in 
the stock of mortgage credit, points towards the ongoing normalisation of the 
domestic credit market, ten years after the economic crisis began.  
 
FIGURE 19 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes: Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.14, Growth rates series codes 17, 17.1 and 17.2. 
 
While the overall stock of credit to enterprises in Ireland provides some insight 
into the financing conditions for companies, the presence of multinationals and 
some large Irish companies makes it difficult to evaluate the borrowing behaviour 
of Irish businesses. A focus on SME credit therefore is warranted to understand 
the financing environment for domestic enterprises. The previous Commentary 
noted that total annual gross new lending to SMEs has grown steadily since 2013 
and, for 2017, total new lending amounted to just over €5 billion, up from 
€4.5 billion in 2016, representing a 10 per cent increase year-on-year.  
 
The data for Q1 2018 indicate a continuation in the trend of higher levels of credit 
for SMEs. Figure 20 outlines the four-quarter rolling average of new lending to 
SMEs with an increase in lending evident. Of particular note is the significant 
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increase in credit to construction and real estate firms as well as to the hotels and 
restaurants sector. These sectors posted year-on-year growth to Q1 2018 of 77 
and 48 per cent respectively. As these sectors are highly reliant on the domestic 
economy, their increased credit usage is reflective of the current strong 
performance of the domestically non-traded sectors. Given the non-traded 
nature of these enterprises, an overreliance on these sectors can lead to a loss of 
competitiveness emerging over the medium term.  
 
FIGURE 20 QUARTERLY NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING 
AVERAGE)  
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
 
While the level of new lending has grown year-on-year, survey data on rejection 
rates for bank finance across SMEs point to diverging trends across firms in the 
ease of credit access. Figure 21 presents the average rejection rate for SMEs 
seeking finance separately for micro, small and medium-sized firms. Overall credit 
supply appears relatively stable over the past number of quarters. However, in 
the most recent survey notable increases in the rejection rates for small firms 
appear to have offset declines in the rejection rate for micro firms. It must be 
noted that Ireland still has a higher rejection rate than the median rate in other 
Eurozone economies. The special article with this Commentary looks at the 
financing activity of Irish SMEs in more detail. Gargan et al. (2018) find a high 
share of internal funds on enterprise balance sheets which suggests that firms 
would have internal capacity to expand their operations regardless of credit 
market access.  
 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
2
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
2
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
2
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
2
20
14
Q
4
20
15
Q
2
20
15
Q
4
20
16
Q
2
20
16
Q
4
20
17
Q
2
20
17
Q
4
Other
Business Services
including ICT and Finance
Hotels and Restaurants
Wholesale and Retail
Construction and Real
Estate
Manufacturing, Transport
and Utillities
Primary Industries
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 8  |  2 5  
FIGURE 21 AVERAGE REJECTION RATE FOR SMES SEEKING FINANCE 
   A. Credit Demand Survey – Ireland by Firm Size       B. European Comparison – Bank Loan Rejection Rates 
 
 
Source:  Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey. 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
A well-documented recent empirical fact is that the cost of finance in Ireland for 
both corporate and household credit is high by European standards. More 
recently, competitive pressures are increasing in the mortgage market and some 
reductions in lending rates are occurring. The standard variable rate on new 
mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 3.13 per cent as of Q2 2018; this is down 
slightly year-on-year from 3.34 in Q2 2017. However, comparing Irish new house 
purchase loans relative to other Eurozone economies, interest rates on 
mortgages in Ireland remain the highest of comparator countries (Figure 22).  
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FIGURE 22 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text, as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the 
new business standard variable rate (SVR) is only for new drawdowns. 
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 23 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for Non-Financial Corporations 
in Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 which is used as a 
proxy for loans for SMEs. In June 2018, the average rate on new loans for all Irish 
corporates was 2.67 per cent whereas the Eurozone average was 1.68 per cent. 
For small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in June 2018 was 4.83 per cent 
compared to the Eurozone average of 2.31 per cent. Interest rates are down year-
on-year for small corporates but remain considerably higher than for their 
European peers.  
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FIGURE 23 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON (%)  
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
Banking sector stability 
With increasing attention focussing on the possibility of overheating in the 
domestic economy, it is informative to examine the consolidated banking 
statistics collected by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) to understand 
whether the domestic economy growth is increasingly financed by external 
exposures as occurred during the previous boom.  
 
These data detail the residence of counterparties, by nationality of the 
international consolidated banking sector. Therefore, the total exposure to the 
international banking sector for an individual country can be observed. Significant 
movements in this exposure can indicate large changes in bank lending in the 
domestic economy.  
 
In Figure 24 the country of residence for financial institutions with the largest 
outstanding stock of lending to the Irish economy is plotted over the period Q4 
1999 to Q1 2018. The loans covered are for all types of financial instruments and 
maturities. 
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FIGURE 24 COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH THE LARGEST 
OUTSTANDING STOCK OF LENDING TO THE IRISH ECONOMY (US$ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
 
 
From the chart it is clear that financial institutions in a number of countries 
significantly increased their lending to the Irish economy in the run up to the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008. UK and German credit institutions, in particular, had 
the largest exposure to the Irish economy at that point, while French and Belgian 
institutions also significantly increased their Irish lending. More recently, after 
2008 all countries, with the exception of the United States, have had a declining 
exposure to the Irish economy. However, the US has seen its financial institutions 
continuously increase their lending to the Irish economy post-2008 such that by 
2018, as a country, the US alongside the UK had the greatest exposure to the Irish 
economy. 
 
Recently, Avdjiev et al. (2018),12 amongst others, suggest using the ratio of total 
cross-border claims to GDP as an indicator of domestic financial stability. As much 
of this lending by foreign institutions would be to the domestic financial sector, 
large movements in cross-border flows could indicate the build-up of imbalances 
both in the domestic economy and domestic credit institutions. In Figure 25 the 
combined total exposures for each foreign country as a ratio of Irish GDP is 
presented. 
 
 
                                                          
 
12  Avdjiev S., Berger B. and H. Shin (2018). ‘Gauging procyclicality and financial vulnerability in Asia through the BIS 
banking and financial statistics’, BIS Working Papers, No. 735.  
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FIGURE 25 RATIO OF TOTAL CROSS-BORDER FLOWS TO THE IRISH ECONOMY TO IRISH GDP 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
 
Similar to the total level of cross-border flows in Figure 25, the ratio illustrates 
the substantial increase in cross-border lending into the Irish economy in the run 
up to 2008. Thereafter, the ratio declines on a significant basis before stabilising 
around 2014. At present, the ratio is back to its pre-2002 level. This indicator 
provides an insight into where the vulnerabilities in the Irish banking sector 
originated from. The improvements in this ratio suggest the financial stability 
threat from foreign lending into the Irish economy has substantially reduced. 
Coupled with the current well capitalised nature of the Irish banking sector 
relative to other European peers (Figure 26), this points towards a more stable 
Irish banking sector at present.  
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FIGURE 26 COMMON EQUITY TIER 1 RATIO FOR IRISH BANKS RELATIVE TO EUROPEAN PEERS  
 
Source:  Data taken from ECB SDW Common Tier 1 Equity Ratio cross country series.  
 
Inflation outlook 
While inflation remained subdued in the first quarter of 2018, more recent data 
point towards a gradual rise in prices. Figure 27 presents the inflation rate for the 
CPI, HCPI, and CPI excluding energy and unprocessed foods. The data to April 
2018 indicate a falling price level. However, prices rose in May, June and July of 
2018 at an annualised rate of 0.4, 0.4 and 0.8 per cent respectively.  
 
Given the modest increase in inflationary pressures, it is interesting to explore 
the variation across different groups of products and services. In the year to July 
2018, increasing prices were evident in the following areas: housing, water, 
electricity, gas and other fuels (+5.4 per cent), alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
(+2.8 per cent), transport (+2.2 per cent), restaurants and hotels (+1.8 per cent), 
and education (+1.6 per cent). Other goods in the economy continue to 
experience declines in price with furnishings, household equipment and routine 
household maintenance down 3.9 per cent, miscellaneous goods and services 
down 3.2 per cent, food and non-alcoholic beverages down 2.1 per cent and 
communications down 2.0 per cent. 
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FIGURE 27 ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
The difference in price trends between the goods and services sectors is quite 
apparent. The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 28) for Q2 2018 indicates 
service prices have averaged a 0.6 per cent annual increase while the price of 
goods has fallen by 0.4 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 28 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In light of the Commentary’s forecast of strong domestic demand and the 
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expected to increase over the next two years. Consumer prices are expected to 
increase moderately by 0.7 per cent in 2018, followed by a 1.1 per cent increase 
in 2019.  
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
A hallmark of the recovery in the Irish economy has been the robust performance 
of household consumption spending. Quarterly growth rates surpassed 3 per cent 
on a year-on-year basis for each quarter between Q3 2014 and Q2 2016. 
Continued increases in consumption levels have been influenced mainly by 
persistent reductions in unemployment, increasing disposable incomes, 
improvements in balance sheets and, more generally, a renewed confidence 
amongst households in the stability of their own finances. 
 
While there was some slowdown in the growth in consumption in late 2016 and 
early 2017, more recent growth rates appeared to indicate an increase in 
consumption activity.  
 
FIGURE 29  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  Quarterly National Accounts at constant market prices and seasonally-adjusted.  
 
Retail sales can be used as a leading indicator for consumption as they provide a 
snapshot of the goods and services households are purchasing and where the 
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growth in household consumption is coming from. Table 3 presents retail sales 
for selected items in terms of the annual growth rate in the volume of sales for 
Q2 2018. For all businesses, retail sales are up 5.8 per cent year-on-year. The 
significant increase from Q1 2018 is driven by a recovery in motor sales. If motor 
sales are excluded, the growth rate is unchanged from Q1 2018, remaining at a 
steady 4.5 per cent growth rate. The recent increase in consumption levels is 
almost certainly related to these changes in retail sales.  
 
TABLE 3 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (Q2 2018) 
Retail Business NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales Annual % change 
Motor Trades 9.5 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 5.5 
Department stores 4.1 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 2.3 
Furniture and lighting 8.2 
All businesses excl. motor trades 4.5 
All businesses 5.8 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The increase in housing market transactions is likely feeding through into the 
strong growth rates of furniture and lighting products, up by 8.5 per cent year-on-
year. The overall trends in retails sales are displayed in Figure 30. This chart 
presents a three-month rolling average of retail sales for total sales, sales 
excluding the motor trade, and for household equipment. Sales of housing 
equipment13 display a very high growth rate (a rolling three-month average of 
12.6 per cent in July), above the average of all retail sales. Quarter 2 data indicate 
an increase in retail sales, both overall and also in the home improvements 
category when motor trades are excluded. As household incomes continue to 
increase and employment growth continues, this should provide a solid 
foundation for further increases in retail spending. 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  This includes furniture and lighting; hardware, paints and glass and electrical goods. 
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FIGURE 30 GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), THREE-
MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 31 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which tracks the 
monthly views of households for their current and future economic perspectives. 
The Index is built on household responses to five specific questions regarding 
their view on the following issues: a) Changes to their own personal financial 
circumstances over the past 12 months; b) Expected changes to their own 
personal circumstances over the next 12 months; c) their view on the broad 
economic outlook over the next 12 months; d) their view on the labour market 
outlook and e) their view on whether or not it is a good time to spend money at 
present.  
 
FIGURE 31 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
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During Q1 2018, the Index rose strongly indicating an increasingly confident Irish 
consumer. However, since April the trend has begun to moderate, and this 
moderation has continued through to August 2018. To understand the relative 
drivers of the overall trend in more detail, Figure 32 presents the trend in the 
sub-components of the Index since January 2016. The chart clearly indicates that 
the growth in the index is coming through channels which relate to the 
households’ own financial situation (FS). The indicators capturing sentiment 
towards the broader economy (both in terms of the macro-economy and the 
labour market) have been softer and are below the level seen in 2016.  
 
At present Irish consumers are dealing with two countervailing trends. First, as 
the domestic economy is growing, many households’ finances are becoming 
stronger and households are increasingly confident in making large purchases. 
Such sentiments accord with the growth in overall consumption as well as the 
large increases in retail sales for larger items like furniture and household goods. 
On the other hand, the ongoing concerns around the economic and financial 
implications of Brexit and growing tensions in global trade present considerable 
uncertainties for households. This is potentially reflected in households’ more 
subdued view on the general economic outlook as consumers assert a relatively 
more cautious outlook. 
 
The extent to which consumption and spending will strengthen in the coming 
quarters is likely to depend on two factors: a) the translation of domestic 
economic growth into improved household finances and b) the impact of 
international events on the Irish economy.  
 
FIGURE 32  ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS – SUB-INDICES 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
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In addition to understanding trends in consumer sentiment, further insight into 
Irish households appetite for spending and views on economic activity can be 
drawn from their savings behaviour. Figure 33 displays the ESRI/Bank of Ireland 
Savings Index, which measures Irish peoples’ sentiment towards savings. The 
overall index had been rising since August 2017. While it dropped slightly towards 
the end of Q1 2018, both July and August 2018 have seen a recovery in savings 
sentiment.  
 
The two sub-indices that compose the Savings Index are the Savings Attitudes 
and the Savings Environment. The recent performance of the overall Index has 
been driven by improvements in households’ attitudes towards savings. As this 
sub-index captures the view of consumers as to whether they are saving 
sufficiently, an increase in this element is likely to accord with the improving 
household financial positions as indicated by the consumer sentiment figures i.e. 
Irish households’ financial positions have improved so therefore they have 
additional financial resources to save. The more subdued element is the savings 
environment sub-index. This captures households’ views on whether it is a good 
time to save now or in 12 months’ time and the relative weakness in this 
indicator is likely picking up the uncertainties relating to the economic 
environment.  
 
FIGURE 33  SAVINGS INDEX AND SUB-INDEXES, ACTUAL 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland. 
 
The overall position of Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial 
and housing assets minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 34. Irish 
household net worth grew by 2.1 per cent in Quarter 4, 2017 relative to 
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Quarter 3, as loan repayments reduce the stock of outstanding liabilities (-0.8 per 
cent), and rising asset prices (+1.7 per cent) raise the total value of domestic 
balance sheets. Net worth is now at the highest level (€726.8 billion) since the Q2 
2007 peak of €719.6 billion. A large proportion of the increase in Q4 2017 was 
driven by a rise in the housing stock of €8.5 billion. Financial assets rose by €5.1 
billion and liabilities declined by €1.2 billion in Q4 2017 relative to Q3 2017.  
 
Household net worth decreased considerably during the financial crisis as housing 
assets fell sharply in value. In Q2 2012, net worth was at €430 billion and housing 
assets were worth €295 billion. In Q4 2017, total net worth was up by 69 per cent 
and housing assets increased by 69.8 per cent. The value of financial assets in the 
Irish economy has increased by 17.2 per cent relative to Q2 2012 while liabilities 
are down by 19.0 per cent. The improvement in overall net worth is driven to a 
large extent by the recovery in the housing market. 
 
FIGURE 34  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
Looking forward, household consumption is set to continue benefitting from 
improving household earnings and more resilient household balance sheets. If 
the continued growth in the domestic economy withstands international shocks, 
household spending will continue to remain robust. We expect consumption 
expenditure to grow by 2.2 per cent this year and 2.3 per cent in 2019. 
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Property market developments 
The latest trends in the domestic property market confirm that residential prices 
are continuing to rise. However from Figure 35 it would appear that, since the 
beginning of the year, the prices of apartments are increasing somewhat faster 
than those of houses.  
 
FIGURE 35 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE INCREASES (%) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
In a recent update of earlier work on house price analysis, McQuinn (2018) 
examines the relationship between actual house prices and those levels 
warranted by fundamental variables in the economy. Examining prices up to Q1 
2018, McQuinn (2018) concludes that, while prices have grown substantially over 
the past number of years, there is still no evidence of a significant divergence 
between actual and fundamental prices. As property prices now appear to be in 
equilibrium, McQuinn (2018), argues that future house price levels should now 
only increase in line with movements in economic fundamentals. 
 
In Figure 36 house price increases for Dublin and the rest of the country are 
plotted. The trends indicate that while the pace of house price growth continues 
to increase outside of Dublin, the rate of price increases in the capital have 
moderated somewhat in 2018. House price growth mid-year is half the rate at the 
outset of 2018. This moderation may be due to the presence of the macro-
prudential regulations which are placing an upper limit on the amount 
prospective homeowners can borrow from financial institutions. The regulations 
are likely to be more binding in the Dublin area where house prices and, 
consequently, the average loan size associated with the property are higher than 
in the rest of the country. 
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FIGURE 36 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE INCREASES FOR DUBLIN AND OUTSIDE OF DUBLIN 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Rental levels also continue to increase across the country. Despite growing 
strongly in 2017, standardised average rents continued to trend upwards in the 
first quarter of 2018. Nationally, rents grew at 7.1 per cent annually in the first 
quarter, up from 6.4 per cent in Q4 2017. Along with the sluggish response of 
housing supply, the continued improvement in the labour market and the 
moderate increase in disposable incomes are contributing factors to the 
continued inflationary pressures in the rental market. 
 
To better understand regional differences in the market and especially 
developments in the Dublin market, the ESRI/RTB rental index now produces 
additional regional indicators. In particular, rental indices are produced for Dublin 
(including the four local authority areas), the Greater Dublin area (GDA) 
(excluding Dublin) and the rest of the country (outside the GDA). While rental 
pressures are evident in Dublin, many of the surrounding counties are also facing 
increasing rents as supply pressures in the city lead to households choosing to 
commute. The results are presented in Figure 37. 
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FIGURE 37 RTB RENT INDEX – DUBLIN, GDA (EXCL. DUBLIN) AND OUTSIDE GDA Q3 2007=100  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office 
 
Rent levels in both Dublin and the GDA (excluding Dublin) have clearly grown at a 
faster pace than the rest of the country since 2013. This could reflect the faster 
pace of economic growth in the capital. Year-on-year, rents increased by 7.8 per 
cent in Dublin and 6.4 per cent in the GDA (excluding Dublin) in Q1 2018. 
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
Investment levels in Ireland have been increasing strongly over the past number 
of years, both in terms of overall investment (which is affected by the activities of 
multinational companies) as well as underlying investment activity (excluding 
aircraft leasing and intellectual property intangibles). Of particular note has been 
the marked pick-up in construction investment that has occurred in recent years 
as the industry begins to respond to rising prices and supply shortages. The latest 
quarterly data available, Q2 2018, indicate a slight decline in investment on a 
year-on-year basis, which is purely driven by a 62.8 per cent reduction in 
intangible investment. This change outweighed the 13.5 per cent increase in 
construction and the 6.8 per cent increase in machinery and equipment year-on-
year.  
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FIGURE 38  COMPONENTS OF INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
 
Focusing on the CSO’s adjusted series for Gross Fixed Capital Formation, modified 
GFCF, (which adjusts for the effects of trade in aircraft by aircraft leasing 
companies and the importation of intellectual property), a different trend 
emerges. It can be seen the adjusted data display a much more consistent growth 
pattern. On an annualised basis overall modified investment increased by 13.2 
per cent in the year to Q2 2018. This is composed of an increase of 14 per cent in 
buildings and construction, a 25 per cent increase in machinery and equipment 
and a 5 per cent decline in intangible assets. 
 
FIGURE 39 MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
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As noted in a previous Commentary, the impact of multinationals on the 
investment data in the National Accounts poses a particular challenge in 
understanding the investment of domestic enterprises and in particular that of 
SMEs. A focus on SME activity is critical given their importance to job creation 
and regional development. Recent research also points towards a productivity 
gap for domestic enterprises (Papa et al., 2018)14 and an investment gap for SMEs 
(Lawless et al., 2018).15 Research by Gargan et al. (2018) published as a Special 
Article to this Commentary uses new survey evidence compiled as part of the 
Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey to provide an overview of 
investment activity by Irish SMEs. They profile the types of assets SMEs are 
investing in, how firms are financing these investments and what barriers firms 
face to investment. A number of findings emerge from their research which are 
important in understanding the divergences between the multinational and 
domestic sectors in Ireland. They find that two in every three SMEs invested in 
their staff, one-in-two invested in fixed assets and less than one-in-ten invested in 
intangible assets in 2016. SMEs were, in general, satisfied with their investment 
levels or their current capacity with only one-in-five facing a capital gap. This 
evidence suggests that SMEs have scope to increase investment in order to 
address capital shortfalls. 
 
One of the interesting findings of the survey is the low share of intangible 
investment amongst Irish SMEs. This contrasts quite starkly with the high share of 
intangibles that makes up the aggregate investment figure. These data can be 
corroborated by analysing the CSO capital stock at a sectoral level. Figure 40 
presents the share of intangible assets as a percentage of total gross capital stock 
by sector over the period, 1985-2014. It can be seen that intangible asset growth 
has risen rapidly in particular sectors (such as ICT, professional, technical and 
scientific, and industry), in recent years. However, such assets are not used as 
capital inputs by many of the large SME sectors (construction, wholesale and 
retail, transport, and accommodation).  
 
                                                          
 
14  Papa, J., L. Rehill and B. O’Connor (2018). ‘Patterns of Firm Level Productivity in Ireland’, Department of Finance 
Technical Working Paper.  
15 Lawless, M., C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker (2018). ‘Estimating an SME investment gap and the contribution of 
financing frictions’, ESRI Working Paper series, No. 589. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 8  |  4 3  
FIGURE 40 INTANGIBLE ASSETS AS PERCENTAGE OF CAPITAL STOCK BY SECTOR (1985-2014) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Annual Capital Stock and Assets Data.  
 
The absence of intangible assets as capital inputs for these sectors may limit the 
extent to which knowledge-based capital can improve their productivity 
performance over the medium term. Recent research by Di Ubaldo and 
Siedschlag (2017)16 highlights the benefit of investment in knowledge-based 
capital for Irish enterprises as a means of improving domestic productivity. 
However, the diverse nature of the SME base, and their low level of investment in 
intangible assets due to more traditional production structures, may pose 
challenges for firms in absorbing technology driven productivity gains. While 
these sectors are large employers and contribute considerably to job creation, 
boosting their labour productivity may be difficult and should be the focus of 
additional research.  
 
Current business sentiment 
To provide some insight into the current plans of enterprises, the Markit 
Purchasing Manager’s Index provides another indicator of activity in the 
manufacturing, services and construction sectors. In Figure 41, an Index reading 
above 50 indicates an expansion. In the first few months of 2018, the Index 
 
                                                          
 
16  Di Ubaldo, M. and I. Siedschlag (2017). ‘The impact of investment in knowledge-based capital on productivity: firm-
level evidence from Ireland’, No WP556, Papers, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), 
https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp556. 
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trends upwards for construction and remains well above 50 for manufacturing 
and services.  
 
FIGURE 41 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
Figure 42 considers the business outlook for purchasing activity as monitored by 
the Markit index. Both indicators are trending upwards in 2018 pointing towards 
an improvement in business sentiment.  
 
FIGURE 42 FORWARD LOOKING INDICATORS FOR PURCHASING ACTIVITY  
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
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Construction investment 
We expect that building investment will continue to increase particularly as the 
rate of housing construction expands. Based on trends in housing market activity, 
we forecast 18,655 units to be completed in 2018 increasing to 24,500 units in 
2019 (Figure 43). Consequently, despite the international uncertainties, we 
expect annual average growth in investment of 9.8 per cent in 2018 and 8.9 per 
cent in 2019.  
 
FIGURE 43 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  CSO and QEC Forecasts. 
 
LABOUR MARKET 
As the Irish domestic economy continues to grow strongly, employment levels for 
the first half of 2018 surpass previous record levels observed for the Irish 
economy in 2007. Seasonally-adjusted unemployment fell by 0.1 percentage 
points to 5.8 per cent in Q2 2018. Persistently low inflation and rising rates of 
growth in wages have resulted in moderate and yet well distributed 
improvements in real earnings for the same period.  
 
Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,17 as it 
includes part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most 
up-to-date and detailed labour market measures. The recent August release of 
the Live Register highlights the downward trajectory of unemployment 
throughout 2018. Since January, the seasonally-adjusted Live Register recorded a 
decrease of 28,600 (-8.6 per cent) in August 2018, leaving a total of 209,900 
 
                                                          
 
17  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Social Protection. 
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people out of work. On a year-on-year basis, this represents a decrease of 38,100 
(-15.4 per cent). As can be seen from Figure 44, 23,200 individuals under 25 years 
old were on the Live Register in August 2018. Relative to July 2017, this 
represents a 19.2 per cent decrease in those registered.  
 
FIGURE 44 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: JULY 2006 TO JULY 2018 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Since 2012 the Live Register publishes detailed data on the duration of the 
registries, which can be used as a proxy for short- and long-term unemployment 
(Table 4). While short-term unemployment experienced the largest decline in the 
initial phase of the economic recovery, since mid-2015 long-term unemployment 
has been falling more rapidly. On a yearly basis, long-term unemployment fell by 
17.7 per cent in August 2018 while short-term unemployment fell by 12.6 per 
cent. 
 
The percentage of long-term unemployed individuals on the Live Register peaked 
at 48.2 per cent in September 2014. This compares with 40.8 per cent in August 
2018. Being unemployed for a very long time can have scarring effects on an 
individual; it might not only lead to the loss of human capital and self-confidence 
but also discourage workers out of the labour force.18 These are the workers for 
whom reintegration in the labour market is the most difficult. Despite a 
supportive policy context, as well as the economic recovery, Ireland’s rate of 
 
                                                          
 
18  Edin, Per-Andres and Magnus Gustavsson (2008). ‘Time Out of Work and Skill Depreciation.’ Industrial Labor 
Relations Review, 61(2): 163-180. 
Abraham, Catharine G., Kristin Sandusky, John Haltiwanger and James R. Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long 
Term Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data,’ Working Papers 16-40, Center for 
Economic Studies, US Census Bureau. 
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long-term unemployment remains high by European standards. Of the 
unemployed, 23.2 per cent are in very-long-term unemployment (three years or 
more). If rates over the last year maintain, it would take almost ten years for the 
very-long-term unemployment to return to the previous lows experienced in the 
period prior to 2007.  
 
TABLE 4  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY DURATION 
 2014 M08 2018 M08 
 (‘000) % (‘000) % 
All durations 398.0  223.6  
Under 1 year 210.5 52.9 130.9 59.2 
1 year and over 187.5 47.1 92.7 40.8 
1 year – less than 2 years 51.6 13.0 24.9 11.2 
2 years – less than 3 years 32.6 8.2 14.3 6.5 
3 years and over 103.3 26.0 53.5 23.2 
 
Source:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
In terms of the last occupation held by those on the Live Register in July 2018, 
craft and related occupations constitutes the largest share of registered 
individuals. This sector also experienced the largest decrease over the past year, 
declining by 18.9 per cent. Based on the CSO’s Monthly Unemployment 
publication,19 the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell to 5.6 per cent in 
August 2018.  
 
 
                                                          
 
19  Unemployment rate is based on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data (which replaced the old QNHS), with Live Register 
data used to adjust trends for periods for when no LFS data are available. 
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FIGURE 45 SEASONALLY-ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
 
Employment 
The Q2 2018 seasonally-adjusted Labour Force Survey indicated that 74,700 jobs 
were added relative to the same period last year (+3.4 per cent), bringing the 
number of persons in employment to 2,256,500. The largest year-on-year growth 
rates were recorded in the construction (+13.7 per cent), accommodation and 
food (+10.9 per cent), and administrative and support service (+8.7 per cent) 
sectors. Annual growth in the ICT sector has modified somewhat in Q2 2018 (+1 
per cent, having increased by 8.8 per cent for the same period last year). 
Agricultural employment decreased by 3.8 per cent for the same period, falling by 
7.8 per cent since the outcome of the Brexit referendum. As Lawless and 
Studnicka (2017) highlight, this sector bears a considerably higher share of 
exposure to potential Brexit fallouts and hence may continue to experience 
disproportionally larger shares of job loss in the future as well.20  
 
As of Q2 2018, employment in the Irish economy now surpasses its previous peak 
level (2,252,200 in Q3 2007). Full-time (seasonally-adjusted) employment 
increased by 72,900 (+4.2 per cent) year-on-year to 1,798,700. Full-time 
employment now accounts for 79.8 per cent of total employment; this compares 
with 82.2 per cent in the Q1 2007 peak and 75.2 per cent in the downturn in Q1 
2013. Part-time employment has risen by 1,200 (+0.3 per cent) to 456,300 and 
now accounts for 20.2 per cent of total employment. 
 
                                                          
 
20  Lawless, M. and Z. Studnicka, 2017. ‘Potential Impacts of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade’, InterTradeIreland, 
Brexit Research Report. Available at: https://intertradeireland.com/brexit/brexit-research. 
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The overall employment rate21 of 68.5 per cent in Q2 2018 remains below pre-
crisis peaks but continues to trend upward. Considerable disparities between 
gender and skills groups remain and in some cases have intensified (Table 5 and 
Table 6). Employment rates are particularly low among the less educated when 
compared to the EU.  
 
Across all the educational levels, the gender gap in employment rates has been 
marginally widening since Q1 2014. In 2014, the gap in employment rates 
between men and women was 10.4 percentage points, in 2017 the gap was 10.6 
percentage points and has averaged 10.8 percentage points in 2018. Employment 
rates among less educated females within the labour force are considerably 
lower; only 24.7 per cent of women with lower secondary education or less are in 
employment, 21.6 percentage points below the rate for men with similar 
education levels. However, the gender gap lessens as the level of education 
increases; 81.4 per cent of women with tertiary education are in employment 
compared with 89.4 of men in the same category. 
 
TABLE 5 EMPLOYMENT RATES (15-64 YEARS) BY GENDER AND EDUCATION (%) 
Gender Education levels  2014 2017 2018* 
Total 
All Education levels  63.1 67.7 68.2 
Lower secondary or below 34.9 37.0 36.6 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 63.2 67.5 68.8 
Tertiary 80.5 84.2 85.0 
Male 
All Education levels  68.4 73.0 73.7 
Lower secondary or below 43.7 46.2 46.3 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 70.4 75.1 76.0 
Tertiary 84.9 88.5 89.4 
Female 
All Education levels  58.0 62.4 62.8 
Lower secondary or below 24.0 25.6 24.7 
Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 56.0 59.7 61.2 
Tertiary 77.0 80.7 81.4 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 2018 uses an average of Q1 and Q2 data. 
 
Overall employment rates in Ireland remain similar to the average among 
European Union countries. In Q1 2018, employment rates among the young (15-
24 years) and the older (55-64 years) are higher in Ireland than the EU average, 
while prime age workers (25-54 years) face lower employment rates. Among the 
least educated of the working age population, employment rates were lower 
relative to the EU market. The lower rates of employment amongst the 15-24 age 
group compared with other EU countries may reflect the relatively high rates of 
 
                                                          
 
21  Defined as the proportion of the working age population that is in employment. 
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tertiary education attainment in Ireland. Participation in the labour force 
continues to improve as labour market shortages begin to arise in various sectors. 
The participation rate for those 15 years and over averaged 62.3 per cent in Q2 
2018, rising from 61.9 per cent the previous year.  
 
TABLE 6  Q1 2018 EMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE GROUP AND EDUCATION (%) 
  Ireland EU 
All Education levels 
Total (15-64 years) 67.9 67.8 
From 15 to 24 years 37.4 34.4 
From 25 to 54 years 79.0 79.7 
From 55 to 64 years 59.4 57.8 
Lower secondary or below 
Total (15-64 years) 36.4 45.1 
From 15 to 24 years 9.1 18.6 
From 25 to 54 years 55.5 61.8 
From 55 to 64 years 45.1 42.9 
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 68.3 70.9 
From 15 to 24 years 51.8 45.9 
From 25 to 54 years 75.8 80.9 
From 55 to 64 years 63.2 59.8 
Tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 85.1 84.4 
From 15 to 24 years 76.7 62.8 
From 25 to 54 years 87.7 88.3 
From 55 to 64 years 71.8 72.8 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office, Eurostat. 
 
The disparities in the employment rates and other labour market outcomes 
across individuals with different educational backgrounds could also be 
suggestive of a skills mismatch in the Irish economy. On a European level, it 
appears a skills mismatch has led to one-in-four employees now operating below 
their productive capacity and 40 per cent of the adult workforce indicating they 
are overskilled in their current roles.22  
 
Conversely, employers in other sectors may be facing greater skill shortages. As 
Figure 46 highlights, the distribution of vacancies is heavily skewed towards the 
ICT, real estate, financial, insurance and other professional, scientific and 
technical activity23 sectors. The overall jobs vacancy rate continues to trend 
upward, rising from 0.7 per cent in Q2 2014 to 1.1 per cent in Q2 2018.  
 
                                                          
 
22  See McGuinness, S., P. Konstantinos and P. Redmond (2017). ‘Skills Mismatch: Concepts, Measurement and Policy 
Approaches’, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 32 (4), pp. 985-1015. 
23  Includes but not limited to legal advice and representation; accounting, bookkeeping, and payroll services; 
architectural, engineering, and specialised design services; computer services; consulting services; research services; 
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FIGURE 46 JOB VACANCY RATE BY SECTOR (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Some of these shortages are being eased through migration and investment in 
training and education. An influx of net migration in 2018 introduced 29,800 
working age individuals to the Irish labour market, representing a 55 per cent 
increase relative to 2017. Of this amount, 2,500 individuals were unemployed 
whereas net migration introduced no additions to unemployment in 2017.  
 
Earnings 
In Q2 2018, seasonally-adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by 2.4 per 
cent to €22.90 per hour relative to the same period last year. The largest increase 
for the quarter was observed in financial, insurance and real estate activities, 
rising annually by 4.3 per cent (an additional €1.73 per hour). Other notably high 
increases occurred in construction (+4.3 per cent), ICT (+4.2 per cent) and 
education (+3.6 per cent). Figure 47 highlights wages persistently trending 
upwards since the end of 2015. As of Q2 2018, average weekly earnings reached 
€742.41, representing a 2.8 per cent increase from €722.09 in Q2 2017. An 
annual increase both in hourly earnings and paid hours resulted in a 5.5 per cent 
rise in average weekly earnings in the construction sector.  
 
 
                                                          
 
advertising services; photographic services; translation and interpretation services; veterinary services; and other 
professional, scientific and technical services. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
All NACE economic sectors Information and communication
Professional, scientific and technical Financial, insurance and real estate
52 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco no mi c  C o mme nt ary  –  A ut um n  20 1 8  
FIGURE 47  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER HOUR (€), SEASONALLY-
ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
Distinguishing between public and private pay, the public sector experienced an 
annual increase of 2.5 per cent to €956.48 per week while private sector 
employees experienced an annual increase of 3 per cent to €682.81 per week. For 
the public sector, average weekly earnings ranged from €838.39 among regional 
bodies to €1,363.13 per week for the Garda Síochána in Q2 2018. Average private 
sector earnings ranged from €356.29 per week in accommodation and food 
service activities to €1,164.51 per week in financial and insurance activities. 
Irregular earnings and bonuses, which are those that are not paid regularly at 
each pay period, appear to have converged for the public and private sectors in 
recent years. For high-earning industries such as ICT or finance, the gap has also 
narrowed considerably relative to last year.  
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FIGURE 48 WEEKLY IRREGULAR EARNINGS, FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE (€) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office 
 
Labour market forecasts 
As the Irish economy approaches full employment, earnings growth has 
increased. With economic activity forecast to be growing at a lower, more stable 
rate over the next two years, the unemployment rate is expected to average 5.7 
per cent through 2018 and 5.0 per cent in 2019. Employment is set to exceed 
2.28 million by the end of 2018, increasing to 2.35 million by the end of 2019. 
While inflows of migrant workers should help maintain competitiveness in the 
domestic market, the upward trend in the vacancy rate suggests labour supply 
has thus far been persistently outstripped by demand. As a result, nominal 
earnings are expected to continue to rise, increasing by 2.8 per cent in 2018, and 
3.4 per cent in 2019.  
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
For the year to August, annual taxation receipts increased by 5.1 per cent. Most 
taxation items registered strong growth with the exception of excise duty and 
customs. Figure 49 illustrates the annual changes in taxation returns for the last 
four years for the main tax categories as well as the overall total amount. 
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FIGURE 49 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%)  
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Taxation receipts closely related to consumption such as VAT continue to increase 
at a significant rate (3.9 per cent) as do pay related social insurance (PRSI) 
receipts. The latter witnessed an annual increase of 4.6 per cent in the year to 
August.  
 
With Budget 2019 due next month it is timely to look at trends in Government 
expenditure for the year to date. 
 
TABLE 7  ACTUAL AND PROFILE CURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE FOR THE YEAR TO JULY 
Category  Actual (€million) Profile (€million) Difference (%) 
Total Current  36,770 36,561 0.0 
Social Protection  13,419 13,417 0.0 
Health 10,271 9,958 2.0 
Education 5,940 5,890 1.0 
Other 7,140 7,296 -2.0 
Total Capital 2,679 3,041 -8.0 
Transport 580 631 -5.0 
Education 431 465 -9.0 
Housing 671 846 -8.0 
Other 997 1,099 -9.0 
Total 39,449 39,602 -8.0 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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Overall Government expenditure is running as envisaged at the outset of the year 
with total actual expenditure identical to the total profile or forecast level. 
However, within the different categories it is evident that much of the capital 
expenditure is less than the profile level. On the current side, actual expenditure 
on health and education is marginally greater than that forecast for the year to 
August.  
 
In Figure 50 we plot Gross current, capital and total voted expenditure over the 
period 2012 to 2018.24 From the chart, it is evident that the major increase in 
expenditure over the past six years has been in capital as opposed to current 
expenditure. 
 
FIGURE 50 CURRENT, CAPITAL AND TOTAL VOTED EXPENDITURE: 2012-2018 (€MILLION) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
Figure 51 presents the debt-to-output ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* 
measure. While both trends indicate that Ireland’s debt sustainability is clearly 
improving, a significant difference is evident between the GDP and GNI* output 
denominators. Using the GNI* measure, it is clear that the ratio is still above 100. 
This highlights the point made in the Monetary and Financial section that the Irish 
economy is still quite vulnerable to any significant changes in the financing costs 
of sovereign debt. 
 
 
                                                          
 
24  We assume that actual = profile in 2018 for both capital and current expenditure. 
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FIGURE 51 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
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General Assessment 
 
Most key domestic economic indicators for 2018 suggest the Irish economy looks 
set to register another strong performance in the present year. While the pace of 
decline in unemployment has slowed to some degree, taxation receipts across all 
the major headings indicate that economic activity is still increasing significantly. 
The relatively strong performance of the global economy also ensures that 
external demand for goods and services produced in Ireland has increased 
somewhat in 2018.  
 
While the Irish economy continues to enjoy the largest growth rate in the Euro 
Area, differences persist between the headline rate of activity suggested by GDP 
and the underlying growth rate of the domestic economy. In this Commentary we 
have revised upwards our growth rate of GDP from 4.7 per cent to 8.9 per cent in 
2018. GDP in 2019 is also now expected to grow marginally quicker than 
previously expected.  
 
However, it is important to understand the reasons for this revision which are 
twofold. First, a significant reduction in the rate of imports of highly valued 
research and technology related services amongst a select few multinational 
firms has caused overall import levels in the Irish economy to actually decline 
over the past year. This, in turn, causes GDP figures to increase more than 
expected. Given these data, we have revised down our import forecasts for 2018 
which in turn raises our overall GDP forecast substantially.  
 
Second, the underlying rate of economic activity, as captured by consumption 
and modified investment, appears to be growing at a faster pace in 2018 than 
previously expected. In particular, the growth in domestic consumption for the 
year to date is particularly strong.  
 
This dichotomy between the headline growth rate and underlying trends 
highlights the difficulties in discerning what is actually going on in the real Irish 
economy. Recent data from the CSO do provide some more information in that 
regard. Gross valued added (GVA) is separated between the multinational and 
other sectors of the economy; the data reveal that the indigenous sector of the 
Irish economy grew by 4.3 per cent in 2017 and 5.4 per cent in 2016. This is at 
variance with the view that almost all of the growth in the Irish economy is 
coming from the multinational sector. The data also appear to indicate that the 
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recovery in the indigenous sector peaked in 2015 when a growth rate of 8.4 per 
cent was observed. 
 
The single biggest threat to the medium-term outlook of the domestic economy 
is the nature of the UK exit from the European Union. The forthcoming summit of 
European leaders next month in October may bring a greater degree of clarity on 
the nature of the British withdrawal, however it is prudent to assume that a no-
deal exit is at this stage a real possibility.  
 
The possibility of a no-deal Brexit has important consequences for the present 
budgetary process. On the one hand as the economy is performing very strongly 
there are legitimate concerns that it may soon overheat, in which case a 
contractionary budgetary policy may well be in order as has been recently 
argued.25 For a small open economy like Ireland which is carrying a voluminous 
public (and private) debt load, policies to build up financial buffers and reduce 
indebtedness are warranted. In particular, at this point in the economic cycle, 
budgetary surpluses would be most desirable and allow a safety net to develop. 
Indeed, Ireland is one of the only small open economies not to be running a 
surplus in the EU at present.  
 
However, at present, there are several significant downside risks to the Irish 
economy to suggest a running a neutral budget may be preferable. First, there 
are key infrastructural bottlenecks in Ireland such as in the public housing area 
that require significant investment by the State. Undertaking such investment can 
add to the productive capacity of the economy, and reduce the increase in 
housing costs which are currently posing a threat to domestic competitiveness.  
 
Detailed research evidence on the structure and composition of households 
facing high housing costs has recently been released by Corrigan et al. (2018).26 
They find the most persistent housing affordability difficulties are for low income 
urban households renting in the private market, who may find it difficult to 
access home ownership at current market prices. Furthermore, additional 
research by McQuinn (2018)27 on the housing market, updating earlier work, 
suggests that housing demand is set to increase over the coming years resulting 
in continued upward pressure on prices. This is likely to exacerbate the 
affordability challenge for the aforementioned households. To address this issue, 
 
                                                          
 
25  IFAC pre-budget statement and statement by Governor of Central Bank of Ireland at McGill Summer School.  
26  Corrigan E., D. Foley, K. McQuinn, C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker (2018). ‘Exploring Affordability in the Irish Housing 
Market’ ESRI Working Paper No. 593, June. This research is from the first year of a three-year research programme 
between the ESRI and the Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government. 
27  McQuinn K. (2018). “Macroeconomic developments in the Irish housing market”, Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI) ‘Exploring developments in the Irish housing and mortgage market’ conference, ESRI, June. 
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policies to increase housing supply and provide social and affordable housing are 
critical and provide a case for public capital investment. The recently announced 
Land Development Agency may help to deliver such supply by addressing issues 
such as the relatively high cost of development land.  
 
The second factor which suggests a non-contractionary budget may be preferable 
is the possibility next year of a no-deal Brexit. If such an outcome occurs then 
there is a possibility that in Q1 or Q2 2019, the Irish economy could face a 
significant, and immediate, adverse economic shock. In such a scenario, it is fair 
to say that the full downside risks for the economy are exceptionally difficult to 
envisage.  
 
Notwithstanding these points, as noted in the previous Commentary, given the 
commitments made concerning future Government investment in infrastructure, 
a neutral budget would leave very little scope for reducing the overall burden of 
taxation in the economy. As the sovereign debt is still very high, particularly when 
compared with GNI* as the output denominator, it is very difficult to justify 
reductions in taxation when the Government balance is still in deficit.  
 
The other major external risk to the Irish economy is the increased protectionism 
in trade policy observed between the United States and China. The scale of tariffs 
now being imposed, particularly on Chinese imports into the United States, is 
almost certain to have a negative impact on global trade. Given the small open 
nature of the domestic economy, this is likely to reduce the contribution to 
growth from the trade balance over the next 18 months. Allied to the Brexit issue, 
increased global trade tension highlights the uncertain external outlook for the 
Irish economy in 2019. A further concern for Irish firms exporting to the UK is the 
continued weakness of Sterling vis-à-vis the Euro; the exchange rate is currently 
at its highest (lowest) since the inception of the Euro in 1999. 
 
Previous Commentaries have highlighted the importance of considering both 
financial sector developments as well as fiscal issues in assessing the possibility of 
overheating in the Irish economy. To that end, in the monetary and financial 
section of the Commentary a new indicator is compiled which tracks the role of 
lending by foreign financial institutions into the Irish economy. The indicator is a 
ratio of total foreign bank lending in the Irish economy to GDP. At present, the 
indicator suggests that foreign lending to the domestic economy, as a proportion 
of underlying economic activity, is back at pre-2002 rates. 
 
Given the difficulties assessing the underlying rate of growth in the Irish 
economy, new information about Irish SMEs is particularly welcome. In a special 
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article to the Commentary, Gargan et al. (2018) use unique survey data compiled 
by the Department of Finance Credit Demand Survey to profile the investment 
decisions of Irish SMEs across the size of the firm, its age group and its sector. The 
authors find that two in every three Irish SMEs invested in their staff, one-in-two 
invested in fixed assets and less than one-in-ten invested in intangible assets in 
2016. Furthermore, with high levels of liquid assets on their balance sheet, and 
one-in-five firms indicating a capital gap, the findings suggest that any perceived 
sluggishness in borrowing or investment appetite could potentially be demand-
side in orientation. From a macroeconomic perspective, this evidence indicates 
that Irish enterprises should have scope to increase investment if they so wished. 
If this materialises, a further boost to investment may be on the horizon.  
 
 
 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
  
  
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 193.0 -0.2 1.8 192.6 11.1 10.0 213.9 5.9 3.3 226.9 
Tourism 4.7 6.1 4.8 5.0 3.0 3.0 5.1 3.2 3.2 5.3 
Other Services 130.4 18.7 16.6 154.7 5.7 5.0 163.6 8.7 7.8 177.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 7.4 7.8 352.6 8.6 7.5 382.5 7.0 5.2 409.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     -0.5     -0.5 
Adjusted Exports 328.2 7.4 7.8 352.6 8.5 7.5 382.5 7.0 5.2 409.4 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.2 28.5 22.6 5.4 27.6 22.5 6.9 23.2 24.2 8.5 
Other Building 11.3 26.2 18.8 14.3 6.0 15.0 16.4 10.0 11.0 19.2 
Transfer Costs 1.1 4.4 -4.2 1.2 9.2 3.0 1.3 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 17.7 23.0 16.0 21.8 17.7 11.9 25.6 18.3 14.2 30.3 
Machinery and Equipment 79.9 -40.9 -41.4 47.2 -12.5 -14.4 41.3 9.6 7.3 45.3 
Total Investment 97.6 -29.3 -31.0 69.0 -3.0 -6.3 67.0 12.9 9.8 75.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.3 27.0 0.9 4.2 2.5 0.1 4.3 1.4 0.1 4.3 
Non-Agricultural Wages 81.8 4.7 3.9 85.7 5.8 5.0 90.7 5.7 5.2 95.8 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15.1 31.5 4.8 19.9 12.8 2.5 22.4 4.8 1.1 23.5 
Total Income Received 100.2 9.5 9.5 109.7 6.9 7.6 117.4 5.4 6.3 123.6 
Current Transfers 22.6 -0.5 -0.1 22.5 4.3 1.0 23.5 1.9 0.4 23.9 
Gross Personal Income 122.8 7.7 9.4 132.2 6.5 8.6 140.8 4.8 6.7 147.5 
Direct Personal Taxes 29.4 4.2 1.2 30.6 3.8 1.2 31.8 3.4 1.1 32.9 
Personal Disposable Income 97.3 5.0 4.8 102.2 7.3 7.5 109.6 5.2 5.7 115.3 
Consumption 91.2 2.9 2.6 93.8 3.9 3.7 97.5 3.5 3.4 101.0 
Personal Savings 7.7 32.5 2.5 10.2 18.3 1.9 12.1 18.5 2.2 14.3 
Savings Ratio 7.9 
  
10.0   11.0   12.4 
Average Personal Tax Rate 16.9 
  
16.8   16.0   14.6 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 87.0 -2.2 -5.5 85.2 7.2 5.0 91.4 6.1 7.2 97.0 
Tourism 5.6 3.4 2.4 5.8 4.7 3.2 6.1 5.4 3.8 6.4 
Other Services 193.2 -10.8 -11.7 172.2 -2.0 -3.4 168.9 6.9 5.5 180.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 285.9 -7.9 -9.4 263.3 1.2 -0.7 266.3 6.6 6.0 283.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.6   -0.6 
Adjusted Imports 285.9 -7.9 -9.4 263.3 1.0 -0.7 265.8 6.6 6.0 283.3 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 328.2 352.6 382.5 409.4 
Imports of Goods and Services 285.9 263.3 265.8 283.3 
Net Factor Payments -49.9 -59.8 -70.9 -74.8 
Net Transfers -3.8 -4.6 -5.1 -5.7 
Balance on Current Account -11.4 24.9 40.6 45.6 
As a % of GNP -5.1 10.7 16.0 16.6 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 112.3 110.4 107.5 105.0 
Industry 394.2 412.0 422.9 429.6 
Of which: Construction 118.6 128.7 143.4 147.3 
Services 1,618.7 1,664.2 1,717.8 1,747.7 
Total at Work 2,132.3 2,194.2 2,257.4 2,313.3 
Unemployed 194.9 157.9 135.6 123.4 
Labour Force 2,327.1 2,352.0 2,393.0 2,436.7 
Unemployment Rate, % 8.4 6.7 5.7 5.0 
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EXPLORING INVESTMENT PATTERNS FOR IRISH SMES: NEW SURVEY 
EVIDENCE1 
Eric Gargan, Martina Lawless, Maria Martinez-Cillero, Conor 
O’Toole* 
ABSTRACT 
An empirical profile of SME investment in Ireland is critical to understanding the 
growth possibilities and productive capacity of Irish indigenous enterprises. 
However little is known about SME investment activity outside the more 
aggregate information. This paper uses new survey evidence compiled as part of 
the Department of Finance SME Credit Demand Survey to profile the types of 
assets SMEs are investing in, how firms are financing these investments and what 
barriers firms face to investment. We provide a detailed exploration of the trends 
across firms looking at different size classes, age groups, exporting status and 
sectors. A number of findings emerge. We find that two in every three SMEs 
invested in their staff; one-in-two invested in fixed assets; and less than one-in-
ten invested in intangible assets in 2016. SMEs were in general satisfied with their 
investment levels or their current capacity with only one-in-five facing a capital 
gap. For those with perceived insufficient investment, a lack of internal funds, 
rather than access to external finance, was identified as the main reason. Finally, 
SMEs reported having significant liquidity levels in 2016. These findings suggest 
that any perceived sluggishness in borrowing or investment appetite could 
potentially be demand-side in orientation.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the determinants of investment activity for domestic Irish SMEs is 
critical in terms of assessing their long-term productive capacity. To have 
adequate scope to grow and develop, firms need to continually invest in fixed and 
other assets to boost output. Indeed, a major determinant of productivity for 
firms is the growth in capital assets at their disposal.  
Following the onset of the financial crisis, aggregate investment activity in the 
Irish economy dropped dramatically. While much of the retrenchment in capital 
 
                                                          
 
1  This research was funded under the Department of Finance/ESRI research programme on the macoeconomy, 
taxation and banking. 
* Eric Gargan is an Assistant Principal in the Banking Policy Division, Department of Finance, Martina Lawless is an 
Associate Research Professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute and an Adjunct Professor at Trinity 
College, Dublin, Maria Martinez-Cillero is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Economic and Social Research 
Institute, and Conor O’Toole is a Senior Research Officer in the Economic and Social Research Institute and an 
Adjunct Associate Professor in Trinity College Dublin. Corresponding author: maria.martinezcillero@esri.ie. 
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formation was accounted for by the adjustment in building and construction, 
investment in machinery and equipment and other non-construction assets also 
fell. At a domestic level, investment activity amongst SMEs also declined. Gerlach-
Kristen et al. (2015) show that the share of SMEs investing in fixed assets declined 
from 55 per cent in 2005 to under 30 per cent in 2013. This fall was even more 
pronounced for micro-sized enterprises.  
 
While undoubtedly the deterioration in the business climate, through poorer 
fundamentals, would have led firms to pull back investment, a number of 
research papers have highlighted the negative impact of the banking crisis and 
credit boom on investment levels. Gerlach-Kristen et al. (2015) show that SMEs’ 
investment was negatively affected by credit constraints following the banking 
collapse. Lawless et al. (2015) show that debt overhang from the boom phase 
also negatively impacted investment activity amongst SMEs. Lawless et al. (2013) 
show that investment financing has shifted to the use of internal funds with a 
major reduction in the usage of bank credit. SME financing has been a popular 
topic of research in empirical literature. The different nature of financing of large 
and small companies has been well established in the literature (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1998), largely due to information opacity. In 
terms of external finance, small firms rely largely on private equity and debt 
markets. However due to information asymmetries between firm managers and 
lending institutions, access to external credit for small firms is highly reliant on 
the availability of collateral and liquidity.  
 
As the economy has recovered, some of the credit market drags on investment 
have abated. Carroll et al. (2016) document a marked pick-up in investment for 
SMEs following the improvements in the domestic economy in 2014 and 2015. 
However the rapid growth domestically in recent years, and the improvements in 
trading conditions for firms, have not seen a substantial increase in SME 
investment activity. Lawless et al. (2018) test the extent to which SME investment 
in Ireland is explained by economic fundamentals and find that, in 2016, firms 
were underinvesting by approximately 30 per cent. A portion of this gap, 
approximately 20 per cent is explained by factors relating to financial market 
issues (indebtedness, interest rates, credit rejections, etc.).  
 
However, given data limitations, a number of unanswered questions remain. 
Three specific issues are of particular pertinence. First, which type of assets are 
SMEs investing in, and is investment activity relatively larger when scaled against 
the level of existing total assets (data which have been missing to date)? Second, 
do firms themselves consider their investment activity to be optimal and what are 
the barriers to investment if not? Third, how much savings do firms hold on their 
balance sheets and how does this link to investment financing? Shedding light on 
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these issues can provide further insight into what is happening with SME 
investment in Ireland.  
 
To address these specific issues, a special ‘Investment activity and company 
assets’ module was appended to the regular Department of Finance SME Credit 
Demand Survey (CDS) to capture data on the aforementioned information gaps. 
The new module captures new information on the types of assets firms are 
investing in, the barriers they face to investment, and information on how they 
finance that investment. More detailed insights of this new information are 
provided in the Data Overview section.  
 
This article provides a first insight into the new data and attempts to address the 
questions raised. A number of important findings emerge. Half of SMEs in the 
sample invested in fixed assets in 2016, however only 7 per cent of firms invested 
in intangibles. Moreover, both the investment level and rate were between 4.5 
and 4.8 times higher for fixed assets than for intangibles. Although a significant 
number of firms invested in staff (66 per cent), the mean and median level of 
investment made by these companies are the lowest relative to all types of 
investment. More than two-thirds of SMEs in the sample reported that they were 
satisfied with their investment levels or with their current capacity. In terms of 
barriers to investment, the lack of internal funds was identified as the main 
reason behind the lack of, or insufficient, investment. Finally, the data suggest 
that SMEs had remarkably high liquidity levels, which might be linked to the low 
demand for external funding sources for investment.  
 
2. DATA OVERVIEW 
The Department of Finance SME CDS contains firm-level data on a random 
sample of Irish SMEs, and is carried out on a biannual basis. It was designed to 
include a good representation of micro, small and medium-sized firms and a 
proportional representation of selected key sectors of the economy. 
 
The 2016 CDS included a new module which contained a series of questions 
specifically asking about firms’ investment activity and assets. In addition, the 
new module in the CDS also contained important questions regarding investment 
financing sources and barriers.2 Past data did not provide any insights on key 
issues such as the types of fixed assets firms were investing in, or staff and 
intangibles investment patterns. Information regarding firms’ value of total assets 
was also absent, which prevented an exploration of the different investment 
rates across SMEs. As part of this module, firms were asked to provide a numeric 
 
                                                          
 
2  A full list of variables available in the new module is provided in Appendix I.  
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figure of the value of their total assets, as well as declaring the percentages of 
assets that were in fixed or liquid form.3 This allowed us to also explore the 
liquidity of Irish SMEs in 2016. Information was also requested on the value of 
turnover, profits, investment per asset or outstanding debt, and the number of 
employees and the value of investment in them. 
 
Some of the value variables obtained through this set of questions (i.e. debt, 
turnover or value of total assets) had a significant share of missing observations. 
For the case of total assets, about 50 per cent of firms did not report a value. 
However, as an alternative to providing the value of total assets, firms were given 
the option to state this information through pre-defined ranges of values. For 
firms which provided a range, the value of total assets was generated using 
multiple imputations.4 After this procedure, the percentage of firms with a 
missing total assets value was reduced to about 18 per cent. 
 
The figures below report the percentage of observations in selected firm 
categories, to provide an overview of the composition of the sample used.  
 
 
                                                          
 
3  Liquid assets include cash, stocks or other liquid assets such as accounts receivable.  
4  An OLS regression was performed in each sub-sample of firms classified in each range, and range-specific predicted 
values were then calculated for each firm. If the predicted value was within the range, it was assigned as the value of 
total assets for that firm. If the value was not within range the value was left as missing.   
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FIGURE 1 DATA OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  ESRI. 
 
Most SMEs included in the sample operated in the Wholesale and Retail sector, 
followed by the Professional and Scientific sector. The sample includes a large 
proportion of micro and small sized firms, as opposed to medium sized firms. 
According to 2015 CSO data, the majority of active enterprises in Ireland fall into 
the micro firm category, while small and medium firms represent 6.4 and 1.1 per 
cent respectively (CSO, 2017b). Therefore, although medium and small firms are 
overrepresented in the sample, which is a common occurrence in SMEs 
microdata, we also include a very high proportion of micro firms. The data include 
a small share of firms with less than ten years of operation, with almost half of 
the firms operating for over 25 years. Although the sample included a number of 
companies which had been in business for less than two years, these companies 
usually are not listed in Company Registration Office records and therefore are 
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not in the database on which sampling is based. For this reason, this analysis 
excludes a certain cohort of very young rapidly growing firms for which credit 
constraints may be quite a significant issue. Finally, just over three-quarters of 
firms included did not export their products outside Ireland.  
 
As is standard in treating extreme observations in microdata studies, outliers 
have been removed from the sample, and were defined as observations situated 
above and below the 99 and 1 percentiles respectively. After cleaning the data, 
the total number of observations in the sample was 1,419. All statistics presented 
in the tables and figures that follow are weighted using probability weights 
provided in the dataset.  
 
3. PROFILING INVESTMENT ACROSS FIRMS 
This section provides an overview of the extent to which Irish SMEs are investing 
in assets and, if investing, explores what type of assets are being purchased. It 
also provides information regarding the size of the investment made in each asset 
class, and the scale of the investment relative to the firm size. For this last 
purpose, investment rates, defined as the percentage of the value of investment 
relative to the value of total assets, are computed. 
 
Column 1 in Table 1 displays the percentage of firms which reported investing in 
2016. Disaggregated information on investment activities by type of asset is also 
provided, which is a novelty of the 2016 data. Overall, just over 80 per cent of 
firms undertook some form of investment activity in either fixed assets, 
intangible assets or staff. Roughly 50 per cent of firms invested in fixed assets in 
2016; however, disparities across different types of assets emerge. Most firms 
invested in machinery, followed by transport, while only 14.6 per cent of firms 
invested in larger types of assets such as buildings. The extent to which Irish SMEs 
are investing in intangible assets (such as new production processes, procedures, 
patents, research and development, branding, etc.) is of great interest. In 
contrast with the importance of intangibles suggested by the National Accounts 
(CSO, 2017a), merely 6.9 per cent of SMEs reported undertaking this type of 
investment. Finally, a large share of firms, 66.4 per cent, invested in staff in 2016.  
 
The average size of investment by asset type is also reported in Table 1.5 The 
mean and median investment levels are reported in Columns 2 and 3, 
respectively. Due to the skewed distribution of investment, which is displayed in 
Figure 2, the mean and median investments are quite different. The largest mean 
investment levels correspond unsurprisingly to buildings, followed by machinery 
 
                                                          
 
5  Note that the statistics of investment levels and rates only refer to investing firms, and not the total sample.   
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and transport. In comparison to fixed assets, the investment level was low for 
intangible assets and particularly for staff.  
 
TABLE 1  INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ASSET 
 All firms Investing firms 
 % Mean inv. Median inv. Inv. rate 
a. Total investment  80.30 79,243 22,000 0.19 
b. Fixed assets 50.21 103,813 45,000 0.24 
Buildings 14.60 123,584 40,000 0.14 
Transport 25.56 51,854 30,000 0.17 
Machinery 35.75 58,365 20,000 0.10 
c. Intangible assets 6.92 21,966 10,000 0.05 
d. Staff 66.41 11,463 5,000 0.02 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
Mean investment rates are also displayed in the last column of Table 1.  
They were calculated as the ratio of the level of investment undertaken in 2016 
by each firm to their level of total assets in 2015.6 This measure facilitates a 
comparison of investment across firms relative to their size, as conclusions taken 
from investment level statistics can be affected by larger firms making larger 
investments. In contrast with the average investment level, the average rate is 
the highest for transport assets, indicating that investment relative to firm size 
was higher for this type of asset. Again, the distribution of the investment rates is 
also quite skewed to the left, as shown in Figure 3. This suggests that most 
investing firms did not invest large amounts relative to their size, regardless of 
the type of asset.  
 
                                                          
 
6  The level of total assets in 2015 is obtained by subtracting the 2016 investment from the 2016 value of total assets. 
Recall, the value of total assets in 2016 for some observations is imputed (see Data Overview section). 
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FIGURE 2 HISTOGRAMS – INVESTMENT LEVEL BY ASSET 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
Note:  Upper values of each distribution have been capped at the level displayed in each histogram. Total investment includes 
investment in fixed assets, intangibles and staff.  
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FIGURE 3 HISTOGRAMS – INVESTMENT RATE BY ASSET 
 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
Note:  Ratios have been capped at 1, except for intangibles and staff investment. Total investment includes investment in fixed assets, 
intangibles and staff. 
 
 
Following the description of the general investment patterns of Irish SMEs, we 
briefly explore whether heterogeneity in terms of firm characteristics affects the 
incidence and level of investment. The graphs provided in Figures 4 to 7 display 
the percentage of investing firms, mean investment rates, and mean and median 
investment levels7 by selected firm categories. These are defined in terms of firm 
age,8 size,9 exporting status10 and sectors.  
 
                                                          
 
7  The percentages of investing firms and the investment level and rates by category on which graphs in Figures 4 to 7 
are based are provided in Tables A.2a and A.2b in Appendix II. 
8  According to the number of years a firm has been operating. 
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FIGURE 4 INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ASSET AND AGE CATEGORY 
 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
A higher percentage of younger firms invested in machinery, intangibles and staff 
while more mature firms invested in buildings and transport assets. However, the 
average investment level appears to be higher for older firms across assets, 
except for transport and intangibles. After accounting for differences in firm size, 
the mean investment rates show younger firms performing higher investment in 
all types of assets and staff. This finding is consistent with the firm lifecycle 
whereby large investments (relative to size) are made early in firms’ existence 
and decline in relative magnitude as firms age.  
 
                                                          
 
9  Defined by the number of employees in each firm. The micro category includes firms that employ between one and 
nine people, small firms have between ten and 49 employees, and medium firms employ between 50 and 249 
people.  
10  Three categories are defined, according to the percentage of output exported to different destinations. One category 
includes firms which export only to UK markets, the second one includes firms which export mostly to countries 
other than the UK (although some UK exports are present in this category, they are of much smaller importance). 
Finally the third category includes firms which do not export production.  
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
Buildings Transp. Machinery Intang. Staff Buildings Transp. Machinery Intang. Staff
%
 
Inv. rates (mean) % inv. firms 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Buildings Transp. Machinery Intang. Staff Buildings Transp. Machinery Intang. Staff
€ 
'0
00
 
Median inv.  
Less than 10 years 10 to 25 years More than 25 years
Mean inv. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 8  |  7 9  
 
FIGURE 5 INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ASSET AND SIZE CATEGORY 
 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
Larger numbers of small and medium sized firms invested in assets, and 
particularly in staff, when compared to micro firms in 2016. Similar patterns 
emerge in terms of mean and median investment levels; however, the 
investment rates indicate that micro firms are investing the most relative to their 
size, as expected of firms setting up and starting production activities. 
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FIGURE 6 INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ASSET AND EXPORTING STATUS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI. 
 
 
Higher shares of firms which export their output exclusively to the UK invested in 
fixed assets (except machinery), intangibles and staff, when compared to the rest 
of firms. Firms which also export to the rest of the world have the largest mean 
and median investment levels. The pattern is less clear when considering the 
investment rates. Non-exporting firms emerge as the main investors in transport, 
machinery and staff; while firms exporting only to the UK are the largest investors 
in intangibles and in buildings. This indicates that the very large mean and median 
investment levels of firms exporting to the rest of the world are somewhat 
distorted by these firms being larger in terms of total assets. 
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FIGURE 7 INVESTMENT BY TYPE OF ASSET AND SECTOR 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
Finally, the same comparison is performed by grouping SMEs in three broadly 
defined sector categories.11 A higher share of firms operating in the industry 
sector invested in assets such as transport and intangibles, and also in staff. 
Industrial firms also display the highest mean investment rates (except for 
intangibles). Firms operating in the services sector have the largest average 
investment rate in intangibles. 
 
4. BARRIERS AND CHALLENGES TO INVESTMENT 
In this section, the attitudes of both investing and non-investing firms are 
explored, to identify potential investment and capacity constraints that might be 
affecting SME growth and development.  
 
                                                          
 
11  See Appendix III for further details regarding the sector composition. 
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For investing firms, the focus is placed on whether they considered their level of 
investment in different types of assets to be adequate or insufficient; while for 
non-investing firms, the possible reasons behind the lack of investment activities 
are explored. The purpose of this analysis is to identify potential investment 
constraints faced by Irish firms which may need to be addressed.  
 
TABLE 2 FIRMS’ PERCEPTIONS  
 Invested less 
Invested 
adequately 
Adequate 
capacity 
Not adequate 
capacity Capital gap 
Total 9.37 46.36 33.4 11.87 21.24 
Young 7.98 44.33 34.66 13.03 21.01 
Old 10.47 46.18 32.39 10.96 21.43 
Export – Yes  10.47 58.53 20.93 10.08 20.55 
Export – No 9.02 41.22 37.32 12.44 21.46 
Industry 10.62 46.9 32.3 10.18 20.8 
Services 9.04 44.59 33.63 12.74 19.77 
Other sectors 9.04 46.33 33.9 10.73 19.77 
Micro 7.61 38.26 39.15 14.99 22.6 
Small/Medium 10.62 50.4 29.32 9.67 20.29 
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Rows add up to 100 per cent (for Columns 1 to 4). 
 
 
The first row in Table 2 shows the percentage breakdown of firms’ reported 
attitudes towards their investing behaviour. Overall, 46.36 per cent of firms 
reported they were satisfied with the level of investment undertaken in 2016, 
while 33.4 per cent of firms stated adequate capacity as the reason not to invest 
in the same year. This implies that over three-quarters of firms were satisfied 
with their decision whether to invest or not. Around 9 per cent of firms invested 
less than they would have liked to, and 11.87 per cent reported not investing 
despite their perceived inadequate capacity. Further details on the latter group of 
firms are provided below.  
 
The fifth column in Table 2 reports the percentage of firms reported to be 
unsatisfied with their capital levels (i.e. a combination of firms that perceived 
they have inadequate capacity and those that were dissatisfied with the 
investment levels). Approximately one-in-five SMEs were unhappy with their 
capacity or investment activities. This finding is broadly in line with the findings in 
Lawless et al. (2018). Differences can be explained by the definition of investment 
and the fact that the empirical model in Lawless et al. (2018) takes into account 
both the extensive and intensive margins of investment.  
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These attitudes are also explored across a selection of firm categories in Table 2. 
A higher percentage of micro firms claimed to be satisfied with their current 
capacity, while most small and medium enterprises reported that they had 
invested adequately. Only 21 per cent of exporting firms reported that they were 
satisfied with their capacity, however most firms in this category said they were 
satisfied with their investment activities. Less variation is observed for firms 
across age categories and sectors. The majority of firms in these categories 
reported that they had invested adequately. 
 
FIGURE 8  INVESTING FIRMS’ ATTITUDES BY ASSET 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
Figure 8 displays the percentages of firms which were satisfied or dissatisfied with 
the investment made for each type of asset (i.e. the percentages reported in each 
bar are built using information only for firms which invested in any type of 
asset).12 In general, most investing firms reported adequate investment 
regardless of the asset type. Buildings and machinery are the two types of assets 
where higher percentages of firms reported unsatisfactory investment, followed 
by intangibles.  
 
                                                          
 
12  Note that it could be the case that a given firm invested in more than one type of asset and reported different 
attitudes (satisfied/dissatisfied) for each type of asset.  
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FIGURE 9  INVESTING FIRMS’ ATTITUDES BY ASSET AND CATEGORY  
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Young firms are defined as those with less than 20 years of operation; and old firms are those with over 20 years of operation. 
 
 
Figure 9 displays reported firms’ attitudes towards investment made by asset and 
also by selected firm categories.13  
 
Again, the majority of firms reported adequate levels of investment across all firm 
categories and assets. Despite this general pattern, larger shares of firms 
operating in the industry sector reported unsatisfactory levels of investment 
 
                                                          
 
13  Intangible assets are not included in Figure 9 due to the low number of observations preventing further breakdown 
into categories. 
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when compared to the other sectors, regardless of the type of asset considered. 
Dissatisfaction with the level of investment affected higher shares of micro firms, 
again for all three types of assets considered. A larger share of exporting and 
older firms reported unsatisfactory investment when compared to non-exporting 
and younger firms respectively, for machinery, but not for transport and 
buildings.  
 
FIGURE 10  NON-INVESTING AND UNSATISFIED INVESTING FIRMS’ ATTITUDES – TOTAL 
 
Reason % of non-adequate capacity firms 
Insufficient internal funds 40.64 
No external finance 11.16 
Uncertainty 26.69 
Other 21.51 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
Figure 10 explores the motives of the sub-sample of Irish SMEs which did not 
invest and those SMEs which were unsatisfied with the level of investment 
performed. The majority of firms, 63 per cent, stated that their current capacity 
was adequate and therefore no investment was deemed necessary. Out of the 
remaining 37 per cent of firms, the main reason for the unsatisfactory investment 
(or lack of) was the unavailability of sufficient internal funds, followed by 
uncertain economic or sector prospects. Only a very small percentage of SMEs, 
11.2 per cent, reported the unavailability of external finance as the reason behind 
their unsatisfactory investment activities. 
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FIGURE 11  NON-INVESTING AND UNSATISFIED INVESTING FIRMS’ ATTITUDES 
(a) Non-investing firms 
 
(b) Unsatisfied investing firms 
 
Reason % of non-adequate capacity firms 
Insufficient internal funds 34.72 
No external finance 9.72 
Uncertainty 30.56 
Other 25.00 
 
 
Reason % of non-adequate capacity firms 
Insufficient internal funds 46.59 
No external finance 12.50 
Uncertainty 25.00 
Other 15.91 
 
 
Source:  ESRI.  
 
 
In Figure 11, the statistics previously discussed in Figure 10 are presented for 
non-investing (Chart (a)) and unsatisfied investing firms (Chart (b)) separately. 
The percentage of firms that despite having an unsatisfactory capacity did not 
invest was 26 per cent. Again, the unavailability of internal resources emerged as 
the main explanatory factor, as for non-investing firms this was main reason 
behind the lack of investment. In addition, most investing firms reported 
insufficient internal funds as the motive for their unsatisfactory investment level. 
An uncertain economic prospect was the next reason in importance for both sub-
samples of firms. Difficulties accessing eternal finance appear to be again the 
least important factor for either not investing or not reaching a satisfactory 
investment level.  
 
5. EXPLORING INVESTMENT FINANCING AND INVESTMENT PLANNING 
After identifying the investment profiles and constraints of Irish SMEs in the 
previous sections, this section is concerned with the sources firms are using in 
order to fund investment. The main objective is to identify whether factors such 
as the costs or the accessibility of the different funding sources might be 
preventing investment.  
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The main novelty of the statistics reported in this section is that they provide 
separated information on the financing sources across different types of assets, 
from large (i.e. buildings) to smaller fixed assets. This section also examines the 
liquidity levels of Irish SMEs in 2016.  
 
FIGURE 12  FIXED ASSETS FUNDING SOURCES  
(a) Buildings (b) Other fixed assets 
  
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  ‘Other’ category includes owners’ contribution, supplier credit or external equity, and leasing-hire purchases for building 
investment.  
 
 
Figure 12 displays the percentage of investing firms using different funding 
sources to cover the costs of investing in large and smaller fixed assets. The 
majority of firms used internal funds, regardless of the asset type. Larger 
differences emerge when looking at the use of external financing provided by 
banks, since 13 per cent of firms resorted to this source of finance to fund 
building investment as opposed to a much smaller 6 per cent of firms that used 
this source of finance to fund investment in other types of assets. Overall, Figure 
12 suggests that SMEs do not seem to match funding sources and asset nature. 
 
Again, the percentages displayed in Figure 12 for all investing firms are further 
analysed by different categories in Figure 13. Despite the further breakdown, it is 
clear that internal funds are the main source of investment funding regardless of 
the firm category and type of asset.  
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FIGURE 13  FIXED ASSETS FUNDING SOURCES BY CATEGORY  
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  ‘Other’ category includes owners’ contribution, supplier credit or external equity and leasing-hire purchases for building 
investment. Young firms are defined as those with less than 20 years of operation, and old firms are those with over 20 years of 
operation. 
 
 
The largest variation in funding sources for building investment emerges across 
sectors and age. Bank borrowing was used by larger shares of young and industry 
sector firms in order to fund investment in buildings. Fewer firms operating in the 
industry sector used internal funds than in any other category for this type of 
asset.  
 
Sector categories present again the most variation in funding sources for the case 
of other fixed assets. Bank borrowing and leasing and hire purchases were used 
by larger shares of firms operating in the industry sector in order to fund 
investment in smaller fixed assets.  
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Given the importance of internal funds as a source of investment financing 
identified in Figures 12 and 13, the liquidity of SMEs is explored in Figures 14 to 
16 and Tables 3 and 4 below.  
 
FIGURE 14  % LIQUID ASSETS DISTRIBUTION 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
 
Figure 14 displays the histogram of the distribution of the percentage of liquid 
assets on total firm assets for all firms. Most firms reported to have at least 50 
per cent of assets in the form of liquid assets. A slightly higher concentration of 
observations below the 50 per cent value can be observed.  
 
According to Table 3, the vast majority of firms, nearly 95 per cent, reported 
availability of liquid assets in 2016. The average level of liquid assets was 
€765,493; however the median was €225,000, again much lower than the mean. 
The distribution of the value of liquid assets across all firms, displayed in Figure 
15, is highly skewed to the left indicating a higher concentration of firms around 
the lower values of liquid assets.  
 
The percentage of firms with liquid assets, and mean and median value of liquid 
assets, are all higher when considering investing firms only.  
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FIGURE 15  LIQUID ASSETS LEVEL 
 
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Value capped at €3,000,000.  
 
 
The average values of two different ratios are also reported in the last two 
columns of Table 3. The first one is the investment-to-liquid assets ratio, which 
gives an indication of the availability of liquid assets relative to the investments 
made by investing firms. On average, the value of investments represented 
roughly 40 per cent of the liquid asset level of both the total sample and investing 
firms in 2016. 
 
TABLE 3 FIRM LIQUIDITY  
 % firms with liquid assets Liquidity levels Ratios 
 Mean Mean Median Investment/ Liquid assets 
Liquid assets/ 
Turnover 
Total 94.82 765,493 225,000 - 0.35 
Investing firms 97.50 897,498 269,000 0.40 0.32 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
The second ratio is the level of liquid assets over the level of firm turnover in 
2016. This can be interpreted as the ‘saving’ capacity of firms. The average value 
of this ratio for all firms was 0.35, indicating that liquid assets represented on 
average about one-third of total turnover in 2016. Unsurprisingly, the ratio is 
lower on average for investing firms. This ratio is reported by firm category in 
Table 4 and the distribution for all firms is displayed in Figure 16.  
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TABLE 4 LIQUID ASSETS/TURNOVER RATIO BY CATEGORY  
 Liquid assets/Turnover 
 Total Investing firms 
Age category 1 0.28 0.26 
Age category 2 0.35 0.30 
Age category 3 0.38 0.35 
Export – UK 0.39 0.46 
Export – Other 0.37 0.34 
Export – No 0.34 0.28 
Micro 0.38 0.34 
Small 0.32 0.30 
Medium 0.36 0.33 
Industry 0.31 0.29 
Services 0.37 0.33 
Other sectors 0.34 0.28 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
 
The ratio is higher on average for older and more established firms, exporting 
firms, micro firms and firms operating in the services sector. When investing firms 
are considered separately, all ratios are on average lower, except for UK 
exporting firms. For this category of firms, the average ratio of investing firms is 
higher than for all firms. The distribution of the liquid assets-to-turnover ratio is 
again skewed to the left.  
 
FIGURE 16  LIQUID ASSETS/TURNOVER RATIO 
 
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Ratio capped at 1.  
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The ratio of total investment level to the level of liquid assets in 2016 is also 
explored in more detail in Table 5. The first two columns display the percentage 
of firms classified above or below 0.5 ratio value, respectively. The third column 
displays the percentage of observations for which the value of the ratio is 1 or 
above. 
 
TABLE 5 INVESTMENT/LIQUID ASSETS RATIO 
 
0 < Ratio < 0.50 0.50 ≤ Ratio < 1 Ratio ≥ 1 
Total 75.32 12.98 11.70 
Age category 1 64.79 19.72 15.49 
Age category 2 72.53 14.84 12.64 
Age category 3 81.11 9.22 9.68 
Export – UK 80 11.67 8.33 
Export – Other 82.14 4.76 13.10 
Export – No 72.7 15.34 11.96 
Micro 64.85 18.18 16.97 
Small 81 11.31 7.69 
Medium 80.95 7.14 11.9 
Industry 68.32 14.85 16.83 
Services 76.45 12.63 10.92 
Other sectors 80.26 11.84 7.89 
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Age category 1, less than ten years; age category 2, ten to 25 years; age category 3, more than 25 years.  
 
 
Three-quarters of investing firms had an investment-to-liquid assets ratio lower 
than 0.50, which indicates that the value of investments made in 2016 
represented less than half of their level of liquid assets in the same year. For 
some firm categories however even higher percentages of firms (above 80 per 
cent) had a ratio below 0.50, such as for firms operating for over 25 years, 
exporting firms or small and medium sized firms. This finding suggests a low need 
for external funds in order to invest.  
 
The third column provides a rough indication of the percentage of investing firms 
that would not be able to fund their 2016 investments solely resorting to internal 
resources, therefore requiring external finance sources to cover the level of 
investment. This is the case for about 12 per cent of all investing firms. Some 
variation exists however when this figure is disaggregated by firm category. 
Almost 18 per cent of firms in the micro and industry sector categories have a 
ratio above 1, suggesting that these types of firms may have higher need for 
external finance. 
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TABLE 6 LENGTH OF LONG-TERM DEBT  
 Mean  Median Min. Max. 
Total  8.59 7 3 60 
Less 10 years 7.74 5 3 60 
10-25 years 7.44 6 3 20 
More 25 years 9.60 8 3 30 
Micro 8.48 6 3 25 
Small 8.49 6 3 60 
Medium 8.92 7 3 30 
 
Source: ESRI. 
Note:  Age category 1, less than ten years; age category 2, ten to 25 years; age category 3, more than 25 years.  
 
 
The low use of external funds is reflected in the prevalence of long-term debt 
uptake for SMEs in the sample. Almost three-quarters of firms (73.6 per cent) did 
not have any long-term debt in 2016. Notably, the percentage of firms without 
long-term debt was slightly higher (76.2 per cent) for firms operating for less than 
ten years. These firms would have been established predominantly after the 
financial crisis, and therefore they would not have had debt overhang originating 
from before the crisis. Table 6 provides an overview of the average length of the 
long-term debt for the remaining one-quarter of SMEs which had incurred debt. 
The median debt term was seven years, although variation across selected firm 
categories can be noted. The median is the lowest for firms operating for less 
than ten years. It increases with firm age, as well as with firm size.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The new investment and assets module on the credit demand survey was 
developed to address clear data gaps in our understanding of Irish SME 
investment activity. A number of important conclusions emerge that provide 
insight for policy but also suggest additional avenues for future research.  
 
In terms of the patterns of investment across Irish SMEs, it is clear there are 
considerable differences by the type of asset. Overall 80 per cent of SMEs 
invested in either staff or other assets. However, this was mainly driven by staff 
investment which was undertaken by nearly 70 per cent of small and medium 
companies. The share of companies investing in fixed assets (building, machinery, 
equipment) was 50 per cent. Only 7 per cent of SMEs invested in intangible 
assets. The median investment level was €22,000 which represented 20 per cent 
of the size of total assets of the firm on average. Investment levels were higher 
for fixed assets (€45,000 median) than for staff or intangibles. Indeed, the median 
investment level was 4.5 times higher for fixed assets than intangible assets.  
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A critical element in understanding the SME sector in Ireland is to capture the 
heterogeneous nature of enterprises. We explore the differences across firms by 
focusing on a number of characteristics including age, size, exporting status and 
sector. We summarise some of the key highlights which document these 
differences (provided in Figures 4 to 7). While older firms invest, the rate of 
investment (how much the firm invests relative to its total assets) is higher for 
young firms and micro enterprises. This reflects the fact that while larger firms 
tend to invest greater volumes in absolute terms, the investments do not 
represent as large a commitment relative to their existing asset base. Industrial 
firms invest more than in other sectors, in particular in transport assets. In terms 
of the trading status of firms, non-exporters displayed higher average investment 
rates in transport and machinery, but not for buildings. Exporting firms invested 
on average more in intangibles. 
 
Having profiled investment activity across SMEs, of particular importance from a 
policy perspective is to ascertain whether or not SMEs are investing sufficiently. 
We find that just under 80 per cent of Irish firms indicate they are satisfied either 
with the level of investment they undertook or the capacity they currently have if 
they didn’t invest. This finding holds in general across different asset types and 
firm characteristics. This suggests a capital gap exists for one-in-five enterprises. 
Some differences across firms exist with exporters to the UK indicating a lower 
level of satisfaction. Medium-sized enterprises are the most satisfied with their 
own capacity. 
 
For those firms that did face a capital gap, the main reasons given were a lack of 
internal funds (40.6 per cent), uncertainty (26.7 per cent) and other reasons (21.5 
per cent). Access to external finance was only suggested as a barrier by 11.2 per 
cent of the firms with a capital gap. This finding accords with the information we 
collated on how firms finance their investment. For both building assets and non-
building assets, nearly 70 per cent of firms reported the use of internal funds as 
the main source to fund investment regardless of the asset type. Although 
external funding provided by banks was found to be used by more firms to fund 
investment in buildings as opposed to smaller fixed assets, the reliance on 
internal funds is widespread.  
 
Finally, for the first time using survey data, we collected information on liquid 
assets. We found a high level of liquid asset holdings amongst Irish corporates 
with a median of €225,000 representing 35 per cent of turnover on average. 
Furthermore, we found that taking the average level of investment by firms as a 
share of liquid assets, only one-in-ten investing firms did not have sufficient liquid 
assets to cover their investments. 
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To reflect on where this leaves our understanding of SME investment from a 
policy perspective, a number of points are noteworthy. It is clear very different 
patterns of investment exist across types of assets and Irish firms are more 
focused on investments in staff and fixed assets than intangibles. While intangible 
assets may reflect a very important component of the Irish economy, in particular 
for the vibrant multinational sector, they are less of a focus for small Irish 
companies. Policies to foster investment activity for domestic firms in such 
assets, where these assets are complementary to their production structure, 
would be welcome.  
 
Irish firms are funding a high share of investment using internal funds. They also 
appear to have considerable liquid assets at their disposal. Coupled with the fact 
that for firms with sub-optimal investment, very few indicate external financing is 
a barrier; this would suggest any perceived sluggishness in investment appetite 
may be originating on the demand side rather than the supply side. Indeed, using 
internal funds for large fixed asset investments is traditionally used as an 
indicator of constrainedness and evidence of a supply-side market failure. 
However, in an Irish context, such a perceived lack of investment demand and a 
low level of borrowing appetite may be down to legacy crisis effects including risk 
aversion or an unwillingness to become indebted, as opposed to (or in 
conjunction with) supply-side tightness. In addition, the crisis may have also 
resulted in reduced consumer confidence in the banking system, and in increased 
difficulties in the application process such as high application costs and imperfect 
screening of applicants (Brown and Lee, 2014). It could also be due to the 
unsuitable nature of the financing products available in the market such as long-
term debt finance. Alternatively, recent research in the UK found that some SMEs 
were ‘reluctant borrowers’ rather than ‘discouraged borrowers’ (Brown and Lee, 
2014), due to an unwillingness to borrow arising from factors such as a resistance 
to any outside intervention that might come from banks or other types of 
lenders.  
 
However, detailed exploration of the issues raised is outside the scope of the 
analysis performed in this paper and further research is required to identify the 
nature of these effects. It is clear that given their liquidity levels, Irish firms would 
have the scope to increase investment if they so wished.  
 
Finally, while our analysis focuses on Irish SMEs, another topic that merits further 
research is a comparison of our findings with other EU Member States, through 
the use of alternative data sources such as the Survey on the Access to Finance of 
Enterprises (SAFE). In addition, a regression analysis would also provide 
interesting insights in future empirical research on this topic.   
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APPENDIX I 
The table below contains a list of the variables obtained from the ‘Investment 
activity and company assets’ module in the CDS. The variables used to obtain the 
statistics presented in this article are in bold.  
 
TABLE A.1 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Survey variables Derived variables 
Value of total assets, 2016  
% of fixed assets, 2016 Value of fixed assets, 2016 
% of liquid assets, 2016 Value of liquid assets, 2016 
% change in value of total assets from 2015 to 2016 Value of total assets, 2015 
Value of turnover, 2016  
% change in value of turnover from 2015 to 2016 Value of turnover, 2015 
% of turnover that corresponded to profit/loss in 2016 Value of profit/loss, 2016 
% of turnover that corresponded to profit/loss in 2015 Value of profit/loss, 2015 
Number of employees, 2016  
Number of employees, 2015  
Value of outstanding debt, 2016  
% change in value of outstanding debt from 2015 to 2016 Value of outstanding debt, 2015 
Average interest rate paid, 2016  
Average interest rate paid, 2015  
Average term for long-term outstanding debt  
Value of investment in buildings, 2016  
Value of investment in transport equipment, 2016  
Value of investment in machinery/other equipment, 2016  
Value of investment in intangible assets, 2016  
% change in value of building investment from 2015 to 2016 Value of investment in buildings, 2015 
% change in value of transport investment from 2015 to 2016 Value of investment in transport equipment, 2015 
% change in value of machinery investment from 2015 to 2016 Value of investment in machinery/other equipment, 2015 
% change in value of intangibles investment from 2015 to 2016 Value of investment in intangible assets, 2015 
% of building investment related to expansion/growth, 2016   
% of transport investment related to expansion/growth, 2016  
% of machinery investment related to expansion/growth, 2016  
% of intangibles investment related to expansion/growth, 2016  
% of building investment related to expansion/growth, 2015  
% of transport investment related to expansion/growth, 2015  
% of machinery investment related to expansion/growth, 2015  
% of intangibles investment related to expansion/growth, 2015  
 Contd. 
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TABLE A.1  CONTD. 
Building investment satisfaction, 2016  
Transport investment satisfaction, 2016  
Machinery investment satisfaction, 2016  
Intangibles investment satisfaction, 2016  
No investment/Invested less than desired – Reasons, 2016  
Building investment – Funding sources, 2016  
Other fixed assets investment – Funding sources, 2016  
Value of staff training, 2016  
Value of staff training, 2015  
Internal rate of return calculation dummy  
Hurdle rate calculation dummy  
Investment uncertainty level   
 
Source: ESRI. 
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APPENDIX II 
TABLE A.2A PERCENTAGES OF INVESTING FIRMS BY CATEGORY 
 Total assets Buildings Transport Machinery Intangibles Staff 
Export – UK 63.39 17.24 39.66 41.74 11.30 74.55 
Export – Other 70.00 16.67 32.48 50.96 10.69 74.15 
Export – No 46.40 13.94 22.60 32.62 5.83 63.96 
Age category 1 45.79 12.31 16.75 40.40 8.63 72.25 
Age category 2 50.54 12.16 26.74 31.87 7.26 64.63 
Age category 3 53.36 17.55 27.75 37.48 6.01 65.77 
Micro 42.25 11.64 22.53 26.71 5.65 43.68 
Small 59.40 15.80 30.67 41.60 8.73 80.32 
Medium 53.30 18.61 21.59 44.00 5.98 92.34 
Industry 54.58 13.89 37.05 39.44 9.06 75.11 
Services 49.66 14.68 24.15 33.55 6.35 62.10 
Other 51.83 15.23 16.33 39.59 6.44 73.14 
 
Source: ESRI. 
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TABLE A.2B INVESTMENT LEVEL AND RATES BY CATEGORY  
 Total assets Buildings Transport Machinery Intangibles Staff 
Export – UK Mean 105,268 109,250 52,065 64,052 17,385 10,845 
 Median 52,000 30,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 5,000 
 Rate 0.20 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.02 
Export – Other Mean 160,718 242,308 62,351 100,318 33,767 22,243 
 Median 70,000 200,000 50,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 
 Rate 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.01 
Export – No Mean 91,850 103,000 49,390 46,330 19,402 9,550 
 Median 37,000 35,000 30,000 15,000 10,000 4,270 
 Rate 0.23 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.05 0.02 
Age category 1 Mean 87,223 89,083 65,546 39,610 23,153 7,693 
 Median 45,000 55,000 50,000 15,000 5,000 400 
 Rate 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.03 
Age category 2 Mean 96,530 114,903 49,232 60,622 22,601 11,594 
 Median 35,000 25,000 30,000 19,000 10,000 4,270 
 Rate 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.02 
Age category 3 Mean 118,528 137,455 51,057 64,095 20,682 12,876 
 Median 50,000 42,500 30,000 20,000 10,000 500 
 Rate 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.01 
Micro Mean 54,671 66,659 39,022 22,324 9,383 3,441 
 Median 20,000 15,000 25,000 8,000 5,000 2,000 
 Rate 0.34 0.20 0.28 0.15 0.06 0.03 
Small Mean 101,712 118,395 55,485 52,179 28,095 10,063 
 Median 50,000 42,500 40,000 20,000 20,000 5,000 
 Rate 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02 
Medium Mean 208,662 210,864 70,888 120,612 29,645 23,197 
 Median 120,000 112,000 50,000 50,000 15,000 12,600 
 Rate 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.06  0.01 
Industry Mean 119,618 88,143 42,672 93,944 21,152 11,220 
 Median 63,000 40,000 30,000 25,000 10,000 5,000 
 Rate 0.37 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.05 0.02 
Services Mean 99,962 126,107 57,573 45,428 19,592 10,131 
 Median 35,500 30,000 30,000 15,000 6,000 4,000 
 Rate 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.02 
Other sector Mean 106,814 155,433 45,656 55,833 32,354 16,605 
 Median 45,000 55,000 40,000 19,500 20,000 6,000 
 Rate 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.02 
 
Source: ESRI. 
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APPENDIX III 
The two tables in this Appendix provide information on the characteristics of the 
sample by sector. In the statistics reported, construction and manufacturing 
sectors have been grouped in the Industry category; and wholesale and retail 
(W&R), hotels and restaurants (H&R) and professional and scientific (P&S) have 
been grouped in the Services category.  
 
TABLE A.3A FREQUENCY (NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS – UNWEIGHTED) 
Frequency (no. observations) – Unweighted  
 Construction Manufacturing W&R H&R P&S Other 
Less than 10 years 22 21 65 44 52 44 
10 to 25 years 53 69 167 54 87 103 
More than 25 years 63 94 225 50 117 89 
Micro 61 60 191 26 128 125 
Small 56 81 216 71 83 63 
Medium 21 43 50 51 45 48 
Export – UK 6 31 52 0 25 14 
Export – Other 9 61 38 1 48 28 
Export – No 123 88 365 147 181 192 
Total 138 184 457 148 256 236 
 
Source: ESRI. 
 
 
TABLE A.3B PERCENTAGE OF OBSERVATIONS (UNWEIGHTED) 
% of observations – Unweighted  
 Construction Manufacturing W&R H&R P&S Other 
Less than 10 years 1.55 1.48 4.58 3.1 3.66 3.1 
10 to 25 years 3.74 4.86 11.77 3.81 6.13 7.26 
More than 25 years 4.44 6.62 15.86 3.52 8.25 6.27 
Micro 4.3 4.23 13.46 1.83 9.02 8.81 
Small 3.95 5.71 15.22 5 5.85 4.44 
Medium 1.48 3.03 3.52 3.59 3.17 3.38 
Export – UK 0.43 2.2 3.69 0 1.77 0.99 
Export – Other 0.64 4.33 2.7 0.07 3.41 1.99 
Export – No 8.73 6.25 25.9 10.43 12.85 13.63 
Total 9.73 12.97 32.21 10.43 18.04 16.63 
 
Source: ESRI. 
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